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INTRODUCTION

Health care is one of the most expensive goods in the American economy,
comprising 13.2% of the American Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 20001 and
projected to reach 17% of the GDP by 2011.2 As health care becomes more
expensive relative to other goods and services,3 health policymakers are
increasingly aware that the method of payment for health care services is
inextricably related to the manner in which those services are provided. In other
words, there is an ethical component to health care finance. 4 This increasing
awareness can be credited to, among other things, the overwhelming influence
of managed care on the American health care system. The success of managed
care in penetrating the American market for health care services has led to a host
of new techniques and devices for the management of health care expenditures,
and implementation of these techniques and devices has led to a reconsideration
of some of the fundamental ethical tenets of medicine. 5
In order to reduce the instance of unnecessary, and potentially even harmful,
medical interventions, managed care imposes oversight on health care expenses.
Oversight includes external controls on physician spending and internal financial
incentives intended to bring the self-interest of the individual physician in line
with the fiscal goals of the managed care organization (MCO).6 This Article will
focus on the financial incentives provided to physicians by MCOs in order to
change physicians' practice methods and patterns,7 and the conflicts of interest
caused by those financial incentives.

1. Katharine Levit et al., Inflation Spurs Health Spending in 2000, HEALTH AFFAIRS,
Jan./Feb. 2002, at 172, 172.
2. See Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, National Health Expenditures
Projections:2001-2011, http://www.hcfa.gov/stats/NHE-Proj/proj200 1/default.htm (last visited
Jan. 18, 2003).
3. Health spending is expected to grow 2.5% faster than the GDP during the period 20012011. See id.
4. Peter Schwartz, Medical Ethics Under Managed Care, 41 INT'L J. FERTILITY AND

STUD. 124, 124 (1996) ("[H]istory may view the impact of managed care on
medical ethics within the physician-patient relationship as the greatest revolution of managed
MENOPAUSAL

care.").

5. The debate over the role of profit in American medicine and the "new ethics" of
managed care are examples. See generallyMARY R. ANDERLIK, THE ETHICS OF MANAGED CARE:
A PRAGMATIC APPROACH (2001) (discussing some ofthe ethical issues facing doctors); E. HAAVI
MORREIM, BALANCING ACT: THE NEW MEDICAL ETHICS OF MEDICINE'S NEW ECONOMICS (1995)

(discussing physicians' changing duties to patients as a result ofchanging economics). However,
some commentators insist that managed care must not be allowed to change the ethical duties
of physicians. See, e.g., Gregory Luke Larkin, EthicalIssues ofManaged Care, 17 EMERGENCY
MED. CLINICS OF N. AM. 397, 399 (1999) ("The ethical obligations of emergency physicians do
not change when practicing in a managed care or any other environment. The physician's
primary responsibility remains with the patient.").
6. Frank A. Chervenak et al., Responding to the Ethical Challenges Posed by the Business
Tools of Managed Care in the Practiceof Obstetrics and Gynecology, 175 AM. J. OBSTETRICS
& GYNECOLOGY 523 (1996).
7. There is some debate in the literature over whether and to what extent various financial
incentives actually affect physician behavior. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
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The rise of managed care in the American health care system has been
described as a "clash of cultures." 8 Drawing on the metaphor coined by C.P.
Snow in his famous "Two Cultures" lecture describing the gulf between
scientists and humanities scholars,9 a 1997 article published in the Journal of the
American Medical Association identified "two distinct cultural traditions"" in
American health care-the commercial culture and the professional culture. The
professional culture is characterized by the traditional Hippocratic notion that
the individual patient's welfare is the primary ethical principle of medical
practice and that the patient is owed undivided duties of fidelity and loyalty by
the physician."1 The commercial culture is characterized by the intrusion of the
market domain and the profit motive into the physician-patient dyad-by the
elevation of commercial interests alongside interests of patient welfare" 2- and
the commercial culture is believed to be in the ascendency. 3 It is this marketoriented vision of health care that imposes financial incentives to alter the
behavior of physicians-physicians being treated for this purpose as primarily
economic actors rather than professionals with ethical obligations to the
individual patient" 4 -and that presumes that patients can negotiate with
physicians and other actors in the health care system for their desired mix of
fidelity and cost-savings, if only the playing field is leveled through appropriate

disclosures. 5 This Article briefly describes the existing managed care financial
incentives and the system within which they operate. Part II will describe the use
of financial incentives in managed care and the resulting popular backlash
against the perceived abuses of the current system. Part III describes the
piecemeal regulation (and attempts at regulation) of these financial incentives,
and demonstrates that regulation generally operates by requiring disclosure. Part

8. John H. McArthur & Francis D. Moore, The Two Cultures and the Health Care
Revolution: Commerce and Professionalism in Medical Care, 277 JAMA 985, 985 (1997).
9. C.P. SNOW, THE Two CULTURES AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 4 (7th prig. 1961).

10. McArthur & Moore, supra note 8, at 985.
11. See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS

312-13 (5th ed. 2001).
12. John D. Blum, Leveraging Quality in ManagedCare: Moving Advocates Back Into the
Box, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 603, 605 (2002) ("[M]anaged care is a creature of the marketplace.").
The market conception of health care is not, of course, exclusively a creature of managed care.
Arnold S. Relman, a professor of medicine at Harvard, has written extensively on the negative
effect of business paradigms on medical practice. See, e.g., Arnold S. Relman, The Impact of
Market Forces on the Physician-PatientRelationship, 87 J. ROYAL SOC'Y OF MED. 22 (1994)
(describing such effects on the physician-patient relationship).
13. Relman, supra note 12, at 22 ("[Pirofessionalism in medicine seems to be giving way
to entrepreneurialism.").
14. Arnold S. Relman, PracticingMedicine in the New Business Climate, 316 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1150,1150 (1987) ("[T]he present trend toward market competition is clearly weakening
the traditional values of our profession.").
15. Of course, the paradigmatic regulatory system dependent on disclosure is the regulation
of the securities industry. In that field, regulation of the content of a public offering has been
subordinated to regulation of the disclosures made about that offering; the operation of market
forces then are able to set an appropriate price, assuming complete transparency of information.
See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (finding that disclosure to
shareholders gave fair information and, therefore, was not deceptive). However, it is worth
noting at this point that such a system has recently been painfully shown not to protect against
the temptations presented by systemic conflicts of interest. Examples include the Enron and
Worldcom scandals. Disclosure is also the paradigm used in campaign finance regulation, a
system not noted for its ethical purity. See, e.g., Editorial, State of the Sleaze, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
28, 1997, at A20 ("We can thank the financial disclosure laws passed during the 1970s for
documenting the corruption of the system. They are good laws, but flawed in their presumption
that disclosure would lead to self-restraint by politicians.").
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IV proposes a new way of thinking about regulation of financial incentives, a
paradigm of respect for the personhood of patients and their unique position
within the health care system, and proposes that the traditional physician-patient
relationship be protected by insulating the central features of the doctor-patient
relationship from the operations of the health care marketplace.
II. THE MANAGED CARE BACKLASH

Until relatively recently, most Americans purchased medical care through
a fee-for-service system. 6 Either the patient paid the physician directly for
services performed, or the patient purchased insurance (or the patient's employer
purchased insurance on his behalf) and the insurance company paid the
physician's charges without substantive inquiry into the reasons for those
charges. As is well documented elsewhere, the growth, for tax and other reasons,
of employer sponsorship of health insurance, combined with advances in
medical technology after World War II, 7 resulted in exponential increases in the
cost of health care."°
The dramatic rate of increase in medical expenditures came to the attention
of the nation during the 1992 presidential election. Bill Clinton strongly
campaigned on the need for management of health expenditures and increased
access to health care services.' 9 However, after his election, his plans for
comprehensive health care reform failed.z In the absence of governmental
reform or regulation, employers, insurers, and others with an interest in health
care costs were left to fashion a private system which would curb the excesses
of traditional fee-for-service medicine. 2' This led to the rise of modem managed
care.

16. In 1980, only four percent of Americans were enrolled in HMOs. In 2000, this number

had increased to 80.9 million individuals. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
National
Center
for
Health Statistics,
Table
147,
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/pubs/pubd/hus/tables/200 1/0 1hus l47.pdf (lastvisited Jan. 18,

2003). Total enrollment in MCOs during 2001 was estimated at 178 million. Centers for

Medicare and Medicaid Services, Managed Care Fact Sheets, National Managed Care

Enrollment 2001, http://www.incareol.com/factshts/factnati.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2003).

17. See Timothy S. Hall, Third Party Payor Conflicts of Interest in Managed Care: A
ProposalforRegulation Based on the Model Rules ofProfessionalConduct, 29 SETON HALL L.
REv. 95, 99 (1998); Barbara Ross-Lee et al., Skewed Incentives in Our Healthcare Delivery
System, 94 J. AM. OSTEOPATHIC Assoc. 849, 854 (noting that technology is potentially
responsible for up to fifty percent of the rise in health costs).
18. See Elena A. Gates, Reproductive Health Under Managed Care: Expanding Provider
Obligations, 22 SEMINARS INPERINATOLOGY 233, 234 (June 1998).
19. David Von Drehle, Clinton Fleshes Out Health CareProposal: UniversalCoverage,
Lower InsurancePledged, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 1992, at A2 1.
20. Dana Priest, DemocratsPull Plugon Health CareReform, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 1994,
at A 1; Dana Priest & Michael Weisskopf, Health CareReform: The Collapse ofa Quest, WASH.
POST, Oct. 11, 1994, at A6.
21. Ross-Lee et al., supra note 17, at 859 ("[T]he current, fee-for-service reimbursement

system create[s] pressures resulting in over-utilization of medical services .... "); Bryce A.

Jensen, Note, From Tobacco to Health Care and Beyond-A Critique of Lawsuits Targeting
Unpopular Industries, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 1334, 1350 ("[M]anaged care ... accomplished

exactly what employers desired.").
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Although health maintenence organizations (HMOs) have been in existence
since the early 20th century, 22 it is in the last decade that these and other forms
of managed care organizations have come to dominate the American health care
system. The American health care marketplace embraced managed care on the
promise that it would provide cost containment, but recent data raise serious
doubts whether managed care can sustain early cost savings. It is clear that
managed care has not delivered true long-term cost reduction. Managed care did
24
provide a temporary reduction in the rate of increase of health care expenses;
however, that deceleration may have been provided by one-time efficiency
gains,25 by artificial "proverse selection" into managed care plans,26 or a
combination of such effects. Recent data show a return to significant health care
inflation, returning in 2001 to double-digit inflation of the magnitude that
sparked the managed care revolution in the first place, with continued doubledigit inflation forecast for the foreseeable future.7
Managed care is characterized by increased oversight by the payor (insurer)
of the expenditures ordered by the provider (physician). Under a fee-for-service
system, there was traditionally little if any oversight or questioning by a payor
of treatment decisions made by a physician. 2 This lack of oversight led to well-

22. Early HMOs were founded on the principle that regularly scheduled preventive care
produces better outcomes and a healthier population. Cost containment was originally merely a side
effect of the intended purpose of HMOs, which was improvement ofthe quality of health. Blum, supra
note 12, at 604. Of course, cost containment has come to be the sine qua non of managed care, or at
least of popular perceptions of managed care. McArthur & Moore, supra note 8, at 987 ("[Managed
care] is increasingly interpreted as meaning 'managed costs'... ."); Ross-Lee et al., supra note 17, at
849 ("Although cost, access and quality are partners in the healthcare reform debate, there is no
question that cost-control is the senior partner."). Contra David A. Hyman, Do Good Stories Make
Good Policy, 25 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 1149 (2000), available at
http://muse.jhu.edu/joumals/joumal-of healthpoliticpolicyand-law/v025/25.6hyman.html
(challenging popular assumptions about the frequency and severity of managed care abuses).
23. After the passage of the Federal HMO Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e-1 to -17(1977), the
number of HMOs in existence grew from 72 to more than 700 in 1987. See Henry Saveth, Health
Maintenance Amendments Act of 1988, 291 PLIITAx 445, 447 (1989). According to recent
estimates, MCOs provided health insurance to 176 million Americans in 2001. Center for
Medicare and Medicaid Services, supra note 16.
24. Robert O. Morgan et al., The Medicare-HMORevolving Door-TheHealthy Go In and
the Sick Go Out, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 169, 169 (1997) ("[T]he assumption has been that
[MCOs] could help slow the growth in the costs of health care for the elderly.") (emphasis
added).
25. Margaret G. Farrell, Consumer Class Actions ChallengingManaged Care Practices,
SG013 ALI-ABA 517, 529 (2001) ("The advent of managed care is credited by some with at
least at one-time lowering of health care costs."); Ross-Lee et al., supra note 17, at 849 ("The
crucial question ...is how to achieve dramatic and sustained cost reductions over time.").
26. See, e.g., Morgan et al., supranote 24, at 174 (stating that enrollment bias in Medicare
HMO enrollment leads to a false picture of savings generated by HMOs); Steffie Woolhandler
& David U. Himmelstein, Extreme Risk-The New CorporatePropositionfor Physicians,333
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1706, 1707 (1995) (criticizing financial incentives for physicians by HMOs).
27. Reuters Health, Employers Push More Health Coverage Costs to Workers, (Apr. 8,
2002) (noting that health care costs to large employers rose 12.1% in 2001 and are projected to
rise 12.8% in 2002), availableathttp://www.vachss.com/helptext/archive/costsworkers.html;
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Highlights-NationalHealth Expenditures,2000
(noting that spending on health care in 2000 increased at "the greatest acceleration seen since
1988," indicating that "the 9-year stability of health spending's share of GDP may end."),
http://cms.hhs.gov/statistics/nhe/historical/highlights.asp (last visited Nov. 5, 2002).
28. Warren Lee Holleman et al., Are Ethics and Managed Care Strange Bedfellows or a
MarriageMade in Heaven?, 349 THE LANCET 350, 350 (1997) ("Many who hold the view that
managed care is unethical overlook the moral problems of the fee-for-service system that
managed care systems are replacing .. ");Adam Yarmolinsky, Supporting the Patient,332
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documented overutilization and widely divergent and scientifically unsupported
practice patterns. So long as a physician's orders are not subject to significant
review, and so long as she is virtually guaranteed payment for her services
without significant oversight, the physician will tend to order medical services
past the point of utility to the patient.29 In order to reduce the instance of
unnecessary, and even harmful, medical interventions, 0 managed care imposes
oversight on health care expenses31 in at least two ways.
Managed care characteristically imposes external controls on physicians'
spendinh decisions." These controls take the form of credentialing, utilization
review, and pre-authorization requirements for costly medical interventions

NEW ENG. J. MED. 602, 602 (1995) ("[Platients fortunate enough to be insured treated their
insurance policies as open accounts.").
29. The patient, being understandably risk-averse in health matters, has an incentive to
agree to additional services which come at no direct cost to himself, even if those services are
of no established benefit, so long as those services do not cause him harm or inconvenience.
Ross-Lee et al., supranote 17, at 851 ("Most patients have little incentive to seek cost-effective
healthcare under either managed care or fee-for-service care."). Moreover, there are serious
information asymmetries preventing the patient from making treatment choices from a position
of full information. See Yarmolinsky, supra note 28, at 602 ("No plan for health care reform has
been proposed, or could be proposed, that would enable patients to determine all the medical
services they might need .... ) The physician has an incentive to order all services to which the
patient will consent, as long as the insurer is willing to compensate her for those services. Alan
L. Hillman, Health Maintenance Organizations, Financial Incentives, and Physicians'
Judgments, 112 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 891, 893 (1990) ("Traditional fee-for-service
settings influence physicians' decision making as well, albeit in the opposite direction, an
approach that may harm patients through greater use of unnecessary medical interventions.").
The physician also may have incentives to order more services in response to actual or perceived
threats of malpractice litigation-so-called "defensive medicine." Ross-Lee et al., supranote 17,
at 852 ("Although recent measures indicate that the direct cost of defensive medicine accounts
for no more than 1% of total health care expenditures, the threat of malpractice may indirectly
affect costs by coloring physicians' judgment.").
30. Chervenak et al., supra note 6, at 524 (explaining that fee-for-service incentives to
perform more services may cause harm to the patient); William S. Parmley et al., Task Force I:
Background and General Principles, 16 J. AM. COLL. OF CARDIOLOGY 7 (July 1990) ("[T]he
physician has a duty to ... refrain from interventions that would be futile.").
31. At least one commentator has argued that one way to help ensure the ethical
palatability of financial incentive structures is to make sure that those who are in charge of
crafting and imposing the incentives be subject to the physician's professional and ethical duties
to the patient. Yarmolinsky, supranote 28, at 602 (proposing legislation prohibiting ownership
of MCOs by for-profit entities).
32. Marshall B. Kapp, Can Managed Carebe Managed?: Some Agnostic Reflections, THE
PHAROS, Spring 1998, at 15 ("The concept of managed care is premised on the fundamental
world view that the conduct of people and institutions may be influenced by financial
incentives.").
33. Credentialing is choosing physicians based on a scrutiny of existing practice patterns
and cost-effectiveness of care provided. See John D. Blum, The Evolution of Physician
Credentialinginto Managed Care Selective Contracting, 22 AM. J. L. & MED. 173 (1996).
Recently, doctors have begun winning due process rights in the credentialing process, restricting
the ability of MCOs to terminate providers in an arbitrary and capricious way. Lowell C. Brown
& Elizabeth Jagla, Credentialing,Peer Review, and ProviderDeselection in Managed Care:
Providersin the Crossfire, 20 WHITrIER L. REv. 375, 376 (2001).
34. The external control on physician behavior is typified by external utilization review
of individual physicians' medical decisions, often before payment is authorized by the MCO.
Ross-Lee et al., supra note 17.
Utilization review arrived in the healthcare system as a quality-control and
cost-containment strategy. However, allowing this function to exist as the
creation of,or off-shoot to, the insurance industry, compromises its qualityof-care intent and realigns its incentive to specifically promote cost-savings
for the industry that it serves.
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such as surgery and referrals to expensive specialty services." Although these

external controls may be effective37in reining in medical expenditures, they are

not accepted graciously by many, and have been criticized as taking medical
authority out of the hands of treating physicians and allowing utilization
38 to
reviewers and other bureaucrats, who may or may not be physicians,
39
exercise inordinate control over physicians' medical judgment.
In addition to external controls, managed care also seeks to encourage

physicians to internalize the ethos of cost-cutting and cost-effective medical
practice. To accomplish this end, MCOs have sought financial means to align
the insurer. Payment
the self-interests of individual physicians with those 4of
4" bonuses and withholds, 1 and provider selection
capitation,
structures, such as
42
and retention based on economic criteria, all tend to cause physicians to
to an extent they
consider economic factors in their medical decisionmaking
43

would not under a pure fee-for-service regime.
The increasing penetration of managed care into the American health
market," together with thepervasive implementation of cost-cutting financial
incentives for physicians, have led to a popular backlash against many
managed care practices.'

While early protests against managed care tended to

focus on particular limitations on care allegedly imposed unilaterally by MCOs,

Id.

35. Managed care often relies on primary-care physicians to perform a "gatekeeper"
function within the health care system by regulating beneficiaries' access to more expensive
surgical and specialty care and by discouraging beneficiaries from seeking specialty care for
treatments which can be performed in the lower-cost environment of the primary care office.
36. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
37. Farrell, supra note 25, at 529 ("[T]wenty seven years [after the Federal HMO Act], we
know that reversing fee-for-service medicine's incentives to provide too much care has produced
incentives to provide too little care.").
38. Jensen, supra note 21, at 1349-50.
39. Id. at 1350 ("[U]nder a managed care system, doctors find themselves relinquishing
much of their professional autonomy.").
40. See infra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
41. These may place from ten to thirty percent ofa physician's income at risk. BEAUCHAMP
& CHILDRESS, supra note 11, at 318.
42. See supra note 33.
43. Jensen, supra note 21, at 1349 (stating that incentives "aligned doctors' financial
interests with those of employers rather than with those of patients").
44. See supra note 16; BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 11, at 318 ("The patient is
in a different position when the physician has incentives to restrictneeded treatment than when
the physician has incentives to provide unnecessarytreatment. In the latter situation, patients can
obtain another opinion. In the former situation, patients may not be aware of a needed
treatment.") (citation omitted).
45. See, e.g., Debra S. Feldman et al., Effects of Managed Care on Physician-Patient
Relationships,Quality of Care,and the EthicalPracticeof Medicine, 158 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL
MED. 1626, 1628 fig. 6 (1998) (showing that fifty-six percent of surveyed physicians believed
that managed care made it difficult to avoid conflicts of interest between the patient's interest
and the physician's financial interest).
46. The increase in litigation against MCOs may have structural causes as well. See Farrell,
supra note 25, at 519 ("By bringing together in a single entity, insurance and service delivery
(risk and the ability to control loss), [MCOs] have provided a legal body to which regulatory and
judicial challenges can be addressed."). The "managed health care as villain" syndrome has also
penetrated American pop culture. See JOHN Q. (New Line Productions 2002) (casting Denzel
Washington as a parent struggling to obtain treatment for his child from an MCO).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

7

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 6
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54: 689

including "gag" clauses,47 "drive-through" deliveries, 4 and others, 49 recent
commentary has taken a broader view of managed care financial incentives,
arguing that such incentives undermine patients' trust in physicians" and the
therapeutic doctor-patient relationship necessary for effective treatment, 51 as
well as undermining the physician's ethical duty to act in the best interest of her
patients52 without regard to personal welfare or social cost.53
In this Article, the term "conflict of interest" will generally refer to ethical
conflicts of interest presented by the double agentry54 aspect of practice within
a managed care system, particularly the double agentry incentivized by forms
of payment embraced by managed care. All methods of payment create their

47. Although all states now specifically ban the use of "gag" clauses, or contractual
provisions prohibiting physicians from discussing particular treatment options with patients,
there is considerable debate in the literature whether such clauses ever existed in the first place.
Compare Warren Lee Holleman et al., Cootinuity of Care, Informed Consent, and Fiduciary
Responsibilities in For-ProfitManagedCareSystems, 9 ARCHIVES OF FAM. MED. 21,23 ("Over
the years, managed care companies have instituted 3 types of gag clauses .... Prior to the new
laws, [a gag clause] was present in nearly every physician contract."), and Woolhandler &
Himmelstein, supra note 26, at 1706 (quoting a restrictive clause from authors' contract with an
MCO), with David A. Hyman, Managed Care at the Millennium: Scenes from a Maul, 24 J.
HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 1061, 1065 (1999) (denying systemic use or enforcement of gag
clauses). However, even given the legal ban on gag clauses, MCOs still have practical power
over physicians' speech. See Bryan A. Liang, The PracticalUtility of Gag Clause Legislation,
13 J. OF GEN. INTERNAL MED. 419, 419 (1998) (stating that the presence of termination clauses
in provider contracts gives MCOs another device for policing the speech of physicians).
48. Gates, supra note 18, at 235.

49. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 11, at 318 ("On the whole, the medical
profession has attempted to address specific conflicts of interest... without attending to general
and systemic issues of conflicts of interest.") (footnote omitted).
50. William L. Winters, Jr., et al., Task Force II: The Relation of Cardiovascular
Specialists to Patients,OtherPhysiciansand Physician-OwnedOrganizations, 16 J. AM. COLL.
OF CARDIOLOGY 11, 15 (1990).
51. Feldman et al., supra note 45, at 1630 ("Most [physician] respondents indicated that
patient trust in the physician is diminished under managed care."); Stephen M. Shortell et al.,
Physiciansas Double Agents: Maintaining Trust in an Era of Multiple Accountabilities, 280
JAMA 1102,1103 (1998).
52. Leonard M. Fleck & Harriet Squier, Just Caring: Facingthe Ethical Challenges of
Managed Care, FAMILY PRACTICE MANAGEMENT, Oct. 1995, at 48 ("A physician in a MCO
cannot be an unrestrictedadvocateof each patient's best interest. That is, a physician's advocacy
can never ignore the needs of the rest of the MCO's members."); see also Feldman et al., supra
note 45, at 1628 fig. 2 (showing that fifty-three percent of surveyed physicians believed that
managed care makes it more difficult to place patient's interests first).
53. Although the primary ethical duty of the physician is owed directly to her patient, there
is no longer any serious doubt that physicians also have social duties to safeguard scarce
healthcare resources. See, e.g., COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AM. MED. ASS'N,
THE ETHICAL ISSUES OF CAPITATION 2 (1997) [hereinafter CEJA Capitation Report] ("It is
entirely appropriate for physicians to feel some obligation to safeguard broader health care
resources ....
") (citing AMA Principles of Medical Ethics, Principle VII), available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/amal/upload/mm/369/report78b.pdf. However, the primary ethical
obligation is still to the patient. Id. ("Adopting dual roles is only cause for concern when the
roles are given equal or nearly equal status and the primacy of individual patient care is
threatened."). Some commentators hold that, although a physician can be a valuable voice in
setting societal health policy, the physician cannot be both social planner and patient advocate
within the same relationship. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 4, at 126 ("The care giver can sit
on organizational panels, can help to set organizational policy, etc., but within a patient-care
giver relationship the physician must be an unabashed advocate for his or her patient.").
54. See Shortell et al., supra note 51, at 1102. "Double agentry" refers to the supplanting
of the traditional patient-centered ethic of the physician with another duty: whether to the
managed care organization, other patients who potentially are competing for scarce health care
dollars, or the physician's own economic or other interests. See Hall, supra note 17, at 105-07.
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own incentive structures.55 Certainly, the fee-for-service system, with or without
private insurance, carried with it the incentive to do more even in the absence
of a clear medical rationale for additional intervention. 56 However, the conflicts
of interest created by managed care payment systems are different in character
than the conflicts presented by fee-for-service medicine,57 and a legal and
regulatory approach designed to minimize the impact of fee-for-service
incentives" cannot be expected to perform the same task under a managed care
system. In any case, the mere existence of conflicts of interest under fee-forservice medicine is not, in and of itself, an adequate response to calls to regulate
the conflicts generated by managed care financial incentives.59
Physicians delivering health care services under a managed care system are
generally paid through one of three mechanisms-salary, fee-for-service, or
capitation. Of these, capitation represents the fundamental innovation of
managed care in aligning the physician's financial incentives and goals with
those of the managed care industry. Capitation has accordingly received the
most attention and criticism in the literature of managed care ethics and
practice. 6 Capitation systems pay the physician a fixed amount of money in

55. Even a supposedly "neutral" payment method such as salary, advocated by some
managed care commentators as a means to avoid the evils of financial conflicts of interest,
carries with it the incentive to maximize the worker's effective hourly compensation by
minimizing the time spent discharging one's duties. See Hall, supra note 17, at 103; see also
Relman, supra note 12, at 22 ("(The] double role of physicians as purveyors of services and
patient counsellors has always raised questions about conflict of interest .... "); Shortell et al.,
supra note 51, at 1102 ("There have also been other factors [motivating doctors], principally the
financial reward.").
56. Fee-for-service medicine, of course, carried its own set of unpalatable incentives. See
Jensen, supra note 21, at 1336-37 ("A plaintiff victory [against MCO incentive structures]
would.., be truly ironic because the removal of incentives that keep doctors from overtreating
their patients will return Americans to the system of health care that they rejected just twenty
years ago.") (footnote omitted); Relman, supra note 14, at 1150 (suggesting new practice
strategies for physicians); Winters et al., supra note 50, at 14.
57. Arnold S. Relman, Dealing with Conflicts ofInterest, 313 NEw ENG. J. MED. 749, 750
(1985); see also Woolhandler & Himmelstein, supra note 26 (criticizing financial incentives for
physicians by HMOs).
58. Prior to the managed care backlash, many of the principal regulations governing health
care providers were aimed at reducing incentives to overspend or overbill. See MARC A. RODWIN,
MEDICINE, MONEY, & MORALS (1995). Thus, federal law and regulations forbid many types of
physician self-referral, fee-splitting or "kickbacks," and overbilling the Medicare and Medicaid
programs (fraud & abuse).
59. Dennis F. Thompson, UnderstandingFinancialConflicts of Interest,329 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 573, 573 (1993) (explaining that existence of one type of conflict of interest does not
eliminate the need or desirability of regulating another type).
60. See Alan L. Hillman et al., HMO Managers' Views on FinancialIncentives and
Quality, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Winter 1991, at 207, 208. Although these three payment systems
constitute the bases for most compensation in MCOs, the marketplace has been prolific in
devising variations and combinations on these three major themes. See Hall, supra note 17, at
101-05.
61. See, e.g., CEJA Capitation Report, supra note 53 (discussing capitation and how it
operates in the medical community); Frances H. Miller, Foreword: The Promise andProblems
of Capitation,22 AM J. L. & MED. 167 (1996) (same); Andrew Ruskin, Capitation: The Legal
Implications of Using Capitation to Affect Physician Decision-Making Processes, 13 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 391 (1997) (same); Woolhandler & Himmelstein, supranote 26,
at 1706 ("The new risk-sharing arrangements are not simply the inverse of fee-for-service.
Instead, they are the inverse of fee splitting."). Fee splitting is the practice of accepting fees in
exchange for referral of patients and is generally considered unethical. See, e.g., Relman, supra
note 12, at 23 (discussing the "traditional ethical rule against earning professional income by
referring patients"); SpecialArticle, The American Academy ofNeurology Code ofProfessional
Conduct, 43 NEUROLOGY 1257, 1258 rule 2.5 (1993) [hereinafter Neurology Code of
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exchange for a contractual agreement to provide a defined set of medical
services to an insured population. The fixed payment is defined in terms of an
amount "per member, per month," and this amount is paid regardless of the
actual amount 6f care demanded by the insured population in any given time
period. In a purely capitated system, the physician or provider group remains
solely financially responsible for costs of care exceeding the capitation
payments,62 thus shifting risk for catastrophic illness from the insurer/MCO to
the provider, and forcing the provider to consider global resource allocation
issues as well as issues of individual benefit from medical spending.63 Because
of this potentially large downside risk, many commentators have singled out
capitation as potentially unethical or risky for physicians, 64 and some have
attempted to articulate guidelines for ethical use of capitation incentives.65 In

fact, the risk of severe financial losses through capitated contracts is managed

through several devices (many of which were admittedly absent or lacking in
early capitation transactions), including informed negotiation by physician
groups of adequate monthly payments to cover expected medical expenses plus
an adequate profit margin, negotiation of appropriate limits on the medical care
covered by the capitation contract, 67 judicious use of stop-loss insurance as a
protective device for participating physicians, limiting capitation contracts to
large groups of physicians to reduce the risk that any one physician's overly
generous use of resources or any one patient's unusually expensive medical
needs could bankrupt the practice,68 and calculating capitation rates from cost
data acquired over a period of time in order to minimize the effect of periods of
inordinately heavy or light resource usage.69 In addition to capitation, MCOs
often use bonus and incentive payments to change physician behavior. The

ProfessionalConduct] (discussing professional fees).
62. Woolhandler & Himmelstein, supra note 26.
63. Shortell et al., supra note 51, at 1103 ("Capitation forces the physician to pay attention
to the denominator of all enrollees in the plan ... and not just the numerator of the individual
patient receiving treatment.").
64. See Dean M. Hashimoto, The Future Role of Managed Care and Capitation in
Workers' Compensation,22 AM. J. L. & MED. 233 (1996); Michael Kraten & R. Michael Yesh,
Health Care Organizations-TheBusiness Implicationsof CapitationRevenue Methodologies,
14 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 15 (1995); Michael J. Malinowski, Capitation,Advances in Medical
Technology, and the Advent of a New Era in Medical Ethics, 22 AM J. L. & MED. 331 (1996);
Frances H. Miller, Capitation& Physician Autonomy: Master ofthe Universe or Just Another
Prisoner'sDilemma?,6 HEALTH MATRIX 89 (1996); Ruskin, supranote 61, at 392-400; Michelle
M. Kwon, Comment, Move Over Marcus Welby, MD. and Make Way for Managed Care: The
Implicationsof Capitation,Gag Clauses, and Economic Credentialing,28 TExAs TECH L. REV.
829 (1997).
65. See, e.g., CEJA Capitation Report, supra note 53, at 6-7 (outlining the Council's
recommendations for applying capitation in an ethical manner).
66. This negotiation was made all the more difficult because of the difficulty that any but
the largest and most diverse physician groups have in obtaining adequate cost and usage data on
the patient population presented by the MCO. Shortell et al., supra note 51, at 1103 ("[W]ithout
detailed information concerning the patients in their care ....
the ability of physicians to deal
with risk is severely compromised.").
67. Although the paradigmatic capitation contract transfers all risk of medical losses to the
physician or physician group in exchange for fixed payments per member, per month, this
arrangement was probably never common, and is today rare or nonexistent.
68. These are among the ethical safeguards recommended by the American Medical
Association in 1997. See CEJA Capitation Report, supra note 53, at 6-7.
69. Id.
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amount of personal income dependent on bonus or contingent payments varies
widely, but can be considerable.7"
The practice of using financial incentives to limit care, combined with
widespread reporting of managed care abuses and denials of needed services,
have lessened the trust that the American public holds for physicians and the
medical industry.7" In response to perceived abuses, the federal and state
governments have stepped into the managed care marketplace with a host of
regulatory devices. The next section describes several of these regulatory
mechanisms and the current legal structure for claims against MCOs for denial
of care.
III.

REGULATORY RESPONSES

The legal system's response to the conflicts of interest presented by
managed care systems is a relatively recent development. It consists of a mixture
of federal and state legislation and regulation, together with private and public
litigation seeking to apply a wide variety of laws, some drafted for the purpose
and some applied to the problem by analogy, to the problem of physician
conflicts of interest in managed care.7" The next section reviews the current state
of regulation of managed care physician financial incentives and concludes that,
with few exceptions, disclosure is the predominant regulatory device, whether
that disclosure is obtained through legislation, litigation, or regulation.73
A. ERISA
74
The Federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)
regulates "employee benefit plans,"75 and health care plans provided by
employers to employees come within the statutory definition of employee
benefit plan.76 ERISA is intended to create a uniform federal jurisprudence
governing employee benefit plans,77 and thus preempts most state laws relating
to such plans.7' However, the managed care backlash has brought with it

70. Woolhandler & Himmelstein, supra note 26, at 1706 ("An internist with
1500... patients might take home more than $150,000 from bonuses and incentives, or nearly
nothing.").
71. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.

72. Litigation challenging practices of MCOs is increasingly framed as class actions. See
Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472 (3d Cir. 2000); In re Managed Care Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d
1310 (S.D. Fla. 2002); Farrell, supranote 25; Jensen, supra note 21, at 1337 (arguing that class
actions against unpopular industries serve as a dubious legal "front" for political pressures and

"forc[e]... the judiciary branches into the unwise and improper role of policymaker"); see also
Kathy Cerminara, The Class Action Suit as a Method of PatientEmpowerment in the Managed
Care Setting, 24 AM. J. L. & MED. 7 (1998) (discussing the use of the class action device in

health care litigation).
73. Disclosure is seen as curative ofconflicts of interest in other healthcare settings as well.
In 1995, a pharmaceutical benefits management company entered into a settlement with
seventeen states in which it agreed to disclose to physicians that it provided financial incentives
to physicians to recommend less expensive drug alternatives to prescribed drugs. See Milt
Freudenheim, Drug Makers 'Managed-CareTies Questioned,N.Y. TIMES, Nov, 10, 1995, at D 1.

74.
75.
76.
77.

29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000).
29 U.S.C. § 1002(3).
29 U.S.C. § 1002(1), (3).
Riofrio Anda v. Ralston Purina Co., 772 F. Supp. 46,50 (D.P.R. 1991), aff'd, 959 F.2d

1149 (1st Cir. 1992).

78. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
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judicial79 and popular outrage over the perceived immunity granted to MCOs by
ERISA, leading to a string of cases limiting the scope of ERISA's preemptive
reach. To the extent that states enact laws purporting to govern health care plans,
an analysis of the efficacy of such laws must begin with a consideration of the
requirements of the ERISA statute and the shifting sands of the ERISA
preemption doctrine.
Most commentators agree that under the current gloss of Supreme Court
rulings on the subject, ERISA preempts claims relating to the administration of
employee benefit plans, including health care plans, but that claims arising from
the medical services provided by a health care plan are not preempted under
ERISA. 0 The Supreme Court has not yet definitively answered the question of
whether state laws purporting to govern managed care financial incentives are
preempted by ERISA. Although cases decided in 2000 and 2002 shed some light
on the subject, many unanswered questions remain.
We begin our consideration of the requirements of ERISA in the context of
managed care financial incentives with Shea v. Esensten.1 Mr. Shea consulted
his primary care physician complaining of chest pains. He related to the
physician his family history of cardiac disease and his history of hospitalization
for chest pains during a recent business trip out of the country. 2 However, Mr.
Shea's physician was of the opinion that Mr. Shea was too young and his
symptoms not severe enough to justify a referral to a cardiologist. 3 Mr. Shea's
physician was also subject to a provision in his contract with Mr. Shea's MCO,
Medica, intended to reduce the number of referrals to specialists. The physician
could receive a year-end bonus for limiting such referrals and would suffer a
reduction in his income for over-referring. Neither of these incentives were
disclosed to Mr. Shea, who reluctantly accepted his primary care physician's
advice. 5 After Mr. Shea died of a heart attack, his widow sued Medica, claiming
that Medica's failure to disclose the financial incentives contained in its provider
contract materially affected her husband's decision not to seek a second
opinion. 6 Had the Sheas been aware of their physician's conflict of interest, the
lawsuit averred, Mr. Shea would have been more skeptical of his advice and
would have sought a cardiologist's opinion at his own expense, which follow-up
care would have in all likelihood discovered his heart disease and enabled him
to receive timely treatment.8 7 Mr. Shea argued that this failure to disclose
constituted a violation of the MCO's fiduciary duty to its enrollees under
ERISA. 8

79. See Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49,53 (D. Mass. 1997) ("[T]his
court had no choice but to pluck [plaintiff's] case out of the state court... and then, at the behest

of [defendant], to slam the courthouse doors in her face and leave her without any remedy.").
80. See, e.g., In re United States Healthcare Inc., 193 F.3d 151 (3d Cir. 1999), cert.denied,
530 U.S. 1242 (2000) (finding that a negligence claim based on MCO policy of discharging
newborns from hospital within twenty-four hours was not preempted by ERISA to the extent it
relies on MCO's actions in arranging for treatment rather than MCO's role as plan administrator
in determining what benefits are appropriate).
81. 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997).
82. Id. at 626.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 627.

85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 626.
Id. at 627.
Shea, 107 F.3d at 627.
Id.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol54/iss3/6

12

Hall: Bargaining With Hippocrates: Managed Care and the Doctor-Patient
2003]

MANAGED CARE AND THE DOCTOR-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP

701

In the Eighth Circuit, ERISA fiduciary duty requires disclosure of "material
facts which could adversely affect a plan member's interests." 9 The court

concluded that "a financial incentive scheme put in place to influence a treating
doctor's referral practices when the patient needs specialized care is certainly a

material piece of information." 90 After Shea, in the Eighth Circuit, 91 MCOs are
thus under a duty to disclose the existence of financial incentives intended to
influence a physician's treatment decisions.92
Other courts have not followed the reasoning of Shea or have chosen to
distinguish it. In Weiss v. Cigna Healthcare,Inc.9 the court refused to impose
a duty under ERISA to disclose financial incentives, holding that any action by

the physician in limiting the care
provided to the beneficiary is not legally
94
attributable to the ERISA plan.

In the Fifth Circuit, Mary Ellen Ehlmann brought an action against the
Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of Texas alleging that Kaiser's failure to disclose
its financial incentives in physician contracts, coupled with allegedly misleading

information in its plan materials made available to beneficiaries, constituted a
breach of its fiduciary duties under ERISA.9 s The Fifth Circuit rejected the claim
that ERISA imposes a broad duty to disclose financial incentives, reasoning that,
had Congress or the Department of Labor wanted to impose such a duty, a
specific requirement would have been written into the statute or regulations.96
The Fifth Circuit distinguished Shea on the basis that Mr. Shea had made a
specific request of his doctor for a referral to a heart specialist and had been
advised that such care was not necessary without disclosure of the financial
incentives discouraging such a referral. 97 Perhaps, then, the Fifth Circuit would

countenance a claim for breach of fiduciary duty on facts similar to Shea

although the court expressly declined to articulate the contours of such a duty. 94
Even in circuits where ERISA has been interpreted to require disclosure of

financial incentives, the question whether the mere existence of financial
incentives can constitute a breach of the ERISA fiduciary duty remained

89. Id. at 628 (citing Varity Corp. v. Howe, 36 F.3d 746, 754 (8th Cir. 1994), aff'd, 516
U.S. 489 (1996)).
90. Id.
91. The Shea holding has not been met with unanimous approval in other courts. See, e.g.,
Weiss v. Cigna Healthcare, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 748, 754-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("CIGNA ...ha[s]
no duty to disclose the nature of its compensation agreements with its physicians ....
").
92. There is no guidance in Shea as to a threshold of the severity of the financial incentive
before the disclosure requirement is triggered. Although arguably some financial incentives
could be regarded as so minimal that they would not trigger the materiality standard, in practice,
all managed care financial incentives are intended to influence the physician's treatment
decisions in order to counteract the perverse incentives of fee-for-service medicine. See supra
notes 39-45.
93. 972 F. Supp. 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
94. Id. at 753-54.
95. Ehlmann v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Tex., 198 F.3d 552, 554 (5th Cir. 2000).
96. Id. at 555. Although the court recognized that ERISA imposes a duty to disclose
"material provisions of a plan," it made no analysis of the materiality of physician financial
incentives except to note that such incentives are not required to be disclosed under relevant
regulations. Id. Although the plaintiff attempted to answer this reasoning by arguing that, at the
time the statute and regulations were drafted, such MCO incentive plans did not exist and thus
could not have been contemplated by Congress or the Department of Labor, the court did not
find this argument persuasive. Id. at 555 n.3.
97. Id. at 556; Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 626 (8th Cir. 1997).
98. Ehlmann, 198 F.3d at 556 ("We do not pass on what sort of disclosure, if any, that
Section 404 might require given a specific inquiry from a plan member or given some other
special circumstance.").
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unanswered until recently.99 In Pegram v. Herdrich'00 the Supreme Court
decided for the first time the question of whether a physician who provides
services under an ERISA plan is a "fiduciary" for purposes of ERISA regulation
and can thus be held liable under ERISA for breach of fiduciary duty for her
actions under a financial incentive structure which arguably led to inappropriate
denials of care.'
On March 1, 1992, Cynthia Herdrich, a beneficiary of an ERISA plan
sponsored by her husband's employer and administered by Carle Health
Insurance Management Co., Inc. (Carle), sought medical care from Dr. Lori
Pegram. On March 7, Dr. Pegram discovered a mass in Herdrich's abdomen. °2
After this discovery, but before further diagnostic testing to determine the nature
of the mass, Herdrich's appendix burst, necessitating emergency surgery.' 3 Dr.
Pegram's decisions to have both the scheduled diagnostics and the surgery
performed at a Carle-owned, and thus cheaper, facility, despite the delay and
inconvenience to Herdrich, were arguably influenced by a direct relationship
between the cost of out-of-network referrals authorized by Pegram and the size
of her year-end bonus from Carle. 4
Herdrich filed a lawsuit against Dr. Pegram and Carle, alleging negligence
in delaying the needed diagnostic procedure, as well as breach of fiduciary duty
under ERISA, in that the cost-containment incentive plan created an
impermissible conflict of interest between Dr. Pegram's duties to Herdrich as a
plan beneficiary and Pegram's financial self-interest. 5 The district court
dismissed Herdrich's ERISA claim, 10 6 but the Seventh Circuit reinstated it,
holding that Carle met the statutory definition of a "fiduciary" due to the ownerphysician's control over the governance of the HMO and over the coverage
decision process. °7

Carle sought and was granted certiorari to the Supreme Court.0 8 Writing for
the unanimous Court, Justice Souter held that Carle was not acting as an ERISA
fiduciary when it, through Dr. Pegram, determined (incorrectly) that Herdrich's
condition was not an emergency, and that she was thus not entitled under the
Plan to immediate treatment at a non-Carle owned facility.' 0 9 Under ERISA,
unlike the common law of trusts, a single entity can permissibly "wear two
hats," acting as fiduciary as to certain of its decisions and actions, but acting out
of self-interest as to others."0 The Court noted that all of Pegram's decisions
arguably affected by the financial incentive- whether to order an immediate
ultrasound and whether Herdrich's condition constituted an
99. Although, in Lancaster v. KaiserFoundationHealth PlanofMid-Atlantic States, Inc.,
958 F. Supp. 1137 (E.D.Va. 1997), the district court for the Eastern District ofVirginia held that
plaintiff's state law claims of negligence and fraud for the establishment and nondisclosure of
financial incentives were preempted by ERISA, the court did not have occasion to consider
whether ERISA itself imposed any duties regarding the scope or disclosure of such incentives.
100. 154 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 1998), rev'd, Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
101. The following description of the Pegram case was published in Timothy S. Hall,
Pegramn v. Herdrich, 14 HEALTH LAW NEWS 15, 15-16 (Sept. 2000).
102. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 215.
103. Id. at 215.
104. Id. at 216 n.3.
105. Id. at217.
106. Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 365 (7th Cir. 1998).
107. Id. at 369-71.
108. Pegram v. Herdrich, 527 U.S. 1068 (1999).
109. Pegramv. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211,214 (2000).
110. Id. at 225.
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"emergency"-contained a strong element of medical judgment or "treatment"
in addition to their effect on the administration of Plan benefits, or "eligibility"
decisions."' The Court characterized these decisions as "mixed" treatment and
eligibility decisions, and concluded that 'mixed' decisions are not within the
definition of "fiduciary" intended by Congress.112
Herdrich claimed at oral argument that the mere existence of the incentive,
independent of any particular act by Dr. Pegram, constituted a breach of
fiduciary duty."' Herdrich asked the Court to distinguish between the incentive
plan used by Carle, which rewards a physician for her own decisions to deny
care, and other incentive plans which base bonuses on the performance of a
large group of physicians or the utilization of a population of patients.'' 4
Although this distinction has support among both medical and legal
commentators, the Court expressly declined the invitation to directly regulate
physician incentives. Justice Souter claimed an inability to distinguish the
"not
... subtle" financial link between treatment and payment in the Carle

network from any other compensation structure used by HMOs,"' and
concluded that since Herdrich sought disgorgement of part of the HMO's
profits, recognition of this suit "would be nothing less than elimination of the
for-profit HMO."" 6 Since Congress has encouraged the formation and operation
of HMOs since passage of the Federal HMO Act in 1973,"' this result was
unacceptable.
In addition to the slippery-slope argument, the Court rested its holding on
doubts as to the courts' institutional competency to resolve disputes over the
proper scope and structure of managed care incentives. While conceding,
arguendo, that the Carle incentive may not be "as socially desirable" as other
possible incentives," 8 the Court deferred to the judgment of Congress on this
matter. "The . ..difficulty of these policy considerations, and Congress'
superior institutional competence . .. suggest that legislative not judicial

solutions are preferable." ' Ifthere are incentive structures which impede the
effectiveness of the doctor-patient relationship, the Court here gives a clear
statement that Congress, or perhaps state legislatures, must be the source of legal
distinctions between permissible and impermissible incentives. 20
Although the Court clarifies that mixed treatment and eligibility decisions
2
are not decisions for which a physician wears a fiduciary hat under ERISA,' '
the consequences of the Court's decision for health plans and beneficiaries
remain unclear. Although the Court clearly signals that ERISA will not be the

11. Id.at 228.
112. Id. at 231.
113. Id. at 227 n.8.
114. Id.
115. Pegram,530 U.S. at 220-21.
116. Id. at 233.

117. 42 U.S.C. § 300e (1994).
118. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 221.

119. Id. at 222 (quoting Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 513 (1982)).

120. But see In re Managed Care Litig. 135 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1257-58 ("[T]he Court in
Pegram did not fashion an all-encompassing cloak of immunity for the health care industry.").
121. Hall, supra note 101, at 16; Pegram, 530 U.S. at 228 n.8. (leaving open the issue of

whether MCOs are "fiduciarfies] insofar as [they have] discretionary authority to administer the

plan, and so ...[are] obligated to disclose characteristics of the plan and of those who provide

services"). MCOs may have ERISA obligations to disclose, if not to forbear from using,
managed care incentives. The extent to which this represents an adoption of Shea's holding that
ERISA contains an affirmative duty to disclose remains unclear.
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source of judicial regulation of physician financial incentives, 122 plaintiffs will
now look to state laws to support claims such as Herdrich's.' Many states have
passed or are considering laws which prohibit MCOs and physicians from
entering into contracts which contain incentives to deny or delay care.1 24 In
addition, state tort law may be invoked in cases when physicians fail to provide
adequate care, whether that failure was caused by negligence or by financial
incentive. In rejecting ERISA fiduciary status for Carle's physician
owner/employees, the Court sends a signal that ERISA may no longer bar the
use of such state laws to regulate "mixed" treatment and eligibility decisions
made by ERISA health plans. 25 As state tort damages are generally regarded as
much more generous for individual claimants than ERISA remedies, Carle's
victory may be a "Pyrrhic" one'26 as state courts expand their tort doctrines to
encompass physician incentive structures adopted by MCOs, and federal courts
increasingly limit the scope of ERISA preemption."'
Another question of state versus federal regulation is raised, and only
partially resolved, by the recent Supreme Court case of Rush PrudentialHMO,
Inc. v. Moran. 28 Moran involved a challenge to a state law requiring that MCOs
allow disputed denials of medical services to be reviewed by an independent
physician. 29 When Rush refused to comply with the state law, Moran sued in
state court.130 Rush argued that Moran's state claim was completely preempted
by ERISA,' because it involved the determination of eligibility for services, not
the quality of the services rendered. The district court eventually agreed, 132 but
the Seventh Circuit held that the Illinois law was not completely preempted.'33
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, agreed with the Seventh Circuit, holding
that the independent review provisions of the Illinois law could coexist with
ERISA.1 4 The Court reasoned that since under ERISA "laws that 'regulate
insurance' are saved from preemption,"' 135 then the threshold question was
whether the state law in question "regulates insurance." Using both a "commonsense" approach as well as the traditional Royal Drug - Pireno test for the

"business of insurance" under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 36 the Court
concluded that the independent review law regulates insurance, and therefore is

122. Hall, supra note 101, at 16; Gary M. Ford & Jennifer E. Eller, Managed Care
Litigation Review, SF83 ALI-ABA 571, 574 (2001) ("[C]laims that mere use of managed care
techniques violated ERISA were largely silenced by the Supreme Court's decision in Pegram
v. Herdrich ....).
123. See Hall, supra note 101, at 16; Thomas R. McLean & Edward P. Richards, Managed
Care Liabilityfor Breach of Fiduciary Duty After Pegram v. Herdrich: The End of ERISA
Preemptionfor State Law Liability for Medical Care Decision Making, 53 FLA. L. REv. 1, 4
(2001).
124. Hall, supra note 101, at 16; see also infra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
125. Hall, supra note 101, at 16; McLean & Richards, supra note 123, at 4.
126. Hall, supra note 101, at 16; McLean & Richards, supra note 123, at 30.
127. Hall, supra note 101, at 16; McLean & Richards, supra note 123, at 32-33.
128. 122 S. Ct. 2151 (2002).
129. Id. at 2156; see 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 125/4-10 (2000).
130. Moran, 122 S.Ct. at 2157.
131. Id.
132. Id. at2158.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 2171.

135. Id. at 2158. Regulation of insurance is traditionally the purview of the states. See

McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2000).

136. Moran, 122 S. Ct. at 2159; see Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440

U.S. 205, 211 (1979); Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982).
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not preempted by ERISA.'37 In response to Rush's argument that the Illinois law
impermissibly infringes on the policy of uniformity expressed in ERISA, the
Court stated that the independent professional review provided for in Illinois'
law did not "supplement or supplant" ERISA's remedies, 3 ' and that any lack of
uniformity in laws applicable to MCOs from state to state is "the inevitable
result of the congressional decision to 'save' local insurance regulation" from
preemption.139
Moran represents further erosion of the oft-quoted doctrine that ERISA
represents a complete insulation of MCOs from accountability for their
decisions. However, just how far that erosion reaches is unclear. Moran did not
involve a state law which imposed independent state liability upon MCOs for
their decision-making or for their imposition of improper incentives on
physicians. In the Fifth Circuit, the case of CorporateHealth Insurance,Inc. v.
Texas Department of Insurance14' held that a Texas law creating a state law
cause of action against MCOs for negligence in delivering medical services was
not preempted by ERISA.' 4' The court specifically excluded the possibility that
the Texas law could result in liability for "denial of coverage for a medical
service recommended by the treating physician."' 42
Remaining questions include whether Moran supersedes Lancaster v.
Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, which held that state claims of negligent
establishment of a financial incentive plan and nondisclosure of that plan were
completely preempted. 143 That determination, and others, will depend on caseby-case analysis of state laws regulating managed care insurance plans, in light
of the "regulation of insurance" savings clause analysis adopted by the Court in
Moran.
Even though ERISA has produced perhaps the most voluminous judicial
pronouncements on the relationship of managed care to the doctor-patient dyad,
ERISA clearly has not been and is not likely to be a panacea for the doctorpatient relationship. ERISA has been used primarily as a shield for MCOs, and
the Supreme Court has clearly signaled its unwillingness to allow the statute to
be used as a sword by managed care plaintiffs, except in extraordinary
circumstances. Pegram clearly shows that the Supreme Court will not consider
managed care financial incentives per se illegal. Even in the absence of per se
illegality status for managed care conflicts of interest, ERISA is not likely to
even produce a uniform federalized doctrine of disclosure of financial incentives
post-Pegram, given the conflicting interpretations in the circuits of the
requirements of ERISA fiduciary status. If Pegram is taken to allow state
experimentation without preemption, some states may enact full disclosure laws,
but it is by no means certain that anr will, or that disclosure laws, once enacted,
would be enforced or enforceable.

137. Moran, 122 S.Ct. at 2163.
138. Id. at 2166 (citing Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987)).
139. Id. at 2168 (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724, 747 (1985)). This
reasoning is not unlimited, as the Court points out that "a State might provide for a type of
'review' that would so resemble an adjudication as to fall within" the preemption doctrine. Id.
140. 215 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 2000), vacatedsubnom. Montemayor v. Corporate Health Ins.,
122 S.Ct. 2617 (2002).
141. Id. at 540.
142. Id. at 534.
143. Lancaster v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 958 F. Supp. 1137 (E.D. Va. 1997).
144. See supra notes 43-45, 92-127 and accompanying text on the multiple difficulties of
enforcing disclosure requirements.
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B. RICO
In light of restrictive ERISA rules and extensive ERISA preemption of state
claims, litigants are increasingly turning to the Federal RICO statute. 14 The
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) 146 was enacted as
an anti-organized crime initiative. 47 Despite this origin, the language of the
statute was intentionally drafted broadly to apply to "any person' meeting the
statutory elements of the crime. RICO has been suggested as a potential adjunct
or alternative to ERISA in the managed care plaintiffs arsenal. 49
Civil RICO damages are much more generous than ERISA remedies. In
order to recover statutory treble damages and attorneys' fees, 5 ° a plaintiff must
establish (1) conduct of an "enterprise" (2) through a "pattern of racketeering

activity"' that causes (3) damage to the plaintiff's business or property.'
Few reported cases have applied RICO to the managed care industry. Those
cases which have do not present a unified approach or hold out much promise
for regulation of managed care conflicts of interest. The first significant
managed care litigation to rely on RICO as a theory of recovery arose in
Nevada. A class of employers and employees sued Humana Health Plans,
alleging violations of, inter alia, ERISA and RICO in Humana's dealings with
its insureds and providers. 3 Plaintiffs had insurance contracts with Humana that
required the insured pay twenty percent of incurred costs for hospital health
care, up to a defined cap (usually $5,000) on annual health expenses.'5 4 The
plaintiffs alleged that Humana negotiated discounts from the usual, customary,
and reasonable rates charged by an affiliated hospital, but failed to take those
discounts into account in calculating plaintiffs' co-payment obligations,'
resulting in the plaintiffs paying more than twenty percent of the cost below the
cap. The district court entered summary judgment for Humana on the grounds
that RICO was preempted by the McCarran-Ferguson Act.5 6 This Act
establishes that regulation of the "business of insurance" is a matter of state
law ' 7 and preempts any federal law to the extent that federal law "invalidate[s],
impair[s], or supersede[s] any law enacted by any State for the purpose of
regulating the business of insurance ... unless such Act specifically relates to

145. Farrell, supranote 25, at 521 ("To file[sic] the regulatory vacuum created by ERISA,

consumers have asserted federal causes of action such as RICO .....
146. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2002).

147. United States v. Dist. Council of United Bhd. of Carpenters, 778 F. Supp. 738, 764
(S.D.N.Y. 1991).
148. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(d).

149. Since RICO is a federal statute, its use in managed care litigation arguably does not
interfere with the goals of ERISA in the same way that state regulation of managed care would.
ERISA contemplates a uniform federal regulatory scheme and is intended to protect employee

benefit plans from the burdens of compliance with a patchwork of state laws. Both of these goals
are consistent with the use of RICO against managed care abuses.

150. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
151. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(c). A "pattern" consists of two acts of "racketeering activity,"
as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), within ten years. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5).
152. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
153. Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 1498, 1501 (D. Nev. 1993).

154. Id. at 1503.
155. Id. at 1501.

156. Id. at 1522.
157. McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (2000).
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the business of insurance.""5 8 Noting that RICO does not "specifically relate to"
the "business of insurance,"' 59 and thatNevada has in place a regulatory scheme
which regulates unfair trade practices by insurers,' 6 the district court entered
summary judgment for Humana. 6 '
The plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which reversed the district
court's grant of summary judgment.'62 The United States Supreme Court
unanimously affirmed, stating that RICO acts as a mere "aid or enhancement"
to the Nevada regulation;'63 thus, application of RICO does not "invalidate,
impair, or supersede" Nevada law. Although Federal RICO damages potentially
greatly exceeded available remedies under Nevada's regulatory scheme, this did
not "impair" the State law." As a result of the Supreme Court's affirmation that
the plaintiffs' RICO claim was, at the least, not preempted by the McCarranFerguson Act, the litigation has now been settled, with Humana agreeing to pay
to the employer purchasers and the employee
approximately $16,000,000
65
insureds combined.1
Not all RICO managed care litigation is as successful. In 1999, plaintiffs
Joseph and Mary Ann Maio and Gary Bender filed a class action lawsuit against
Aetna, Inc. and affiliated entities (Aetna), alleging that defendants had engaged
in a pattern of misrepresentation of its health insurance products. 6 6 Specifically,
plaintiffs alleged that Aetna, while representing to enrollees that its goal was to
raise the quality of health care delivered by its providers, was simultaneously
imposing financial incentives and contract terms on its providers solely to limit
the quantity of care delivered and to hold down costs; such cost-containment

efforts, the plaintiffs alleged, were undisclosed to them.' The plaintiffs' RICO
claims were dismissed on a summary judgment motion by defendants. 6 1 On
appeal to the Third Circuit, the dismissal was affirmed. 169 The court found that,
even assuming the truth of plaintiffs' factual allegations, plaintiffs had not pled
sufficient injury to sustain a RICO cause of action. RICO requires that plaintiffs
show "injury to business or property" in order to prevail, and the plaintiffs'
allegations of diminution in quality of health services provided due to the
operation of managed care physician conflicts of interest did not constitute

"injury to business or property.""' Such a showing would require "proof of a
concrete financial loss and not mere injury to a valuable intangible property

158. Id. § 1012(b).
159. Forsyth, 827 F. Supp. at 1520.
160. Id. at 1521. In fact, the Nevada state law in question was preempted by the provisions
of ERISA. Id. at 1522. However, the district court did not allow this fact to save the plaintiffs'
RICO claim. Id.
161. Id. at 1522.
162. Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1482 (9th Cir. 1997).
163. Humana, Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299, 303 (1999).
164. Id. at 308.
165. Edith M. Kallas et al., Class Actions In Healthcare Context, 1216 PLI/Corp 9,
V(A)(l)(a) (2000) ("Humana agreed to pay the co-payor class $11,986,200 and the premium
payor class $4,113,800.").
166. Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 474 (3d Cir. 2000).
167. Id. at 474-79.
168. Id. at 474.
169. Id. at 502.
170. Id. at 482.
171. Id. at 501.
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interest."' 72 Since the property plaintiffs claim was impaired was a contract
right- the right to covered health services- the court reasoned that the only
way the plaintiffs could show injury to that property right is by showing that the
defendants failed to perform their contractual duties. r In order to make out a
showing of failure to perform, the court states, plaintiffs would be required to
introduce evidence of plaintiffs' "receipt of inadequate, inferior or delayed care,
personal injuries resulting therefrom, or Aetna's denial of benefits due under the
insurance arrangement." " However, plaintiffs in Maio expressly disclaimed
actual diminution in the health care provided as a basis for their RICO claim;
they asserted that the mere existence of undisclosed provider incentives and
conflicts of interest constituted cognizable injury.'
While the Maio court based its holding solely on the lack of a RICO injury
to "business or property,"' 76 the district court articulated other hurdles that a
successful plaintiff must overcome to apply RICO to managed care conflicts of
interest. First, a plaintiff must establish the existence of a RICO "enterprise."' 77
Second, the district court stated, and the Third Circuit reiterated, that it is
"highly doubtful that advertising one's commitment to 'quality of care' can
serve as the predicate for a fraud claim."' Finally, the district court articulated
legal process concerns similar to those articulated by Justice Souter in Herdrich
v. Pegram:179 "[P]laintiffs' expression of dissatisfaction with defendants'
plans-indeed, with HMOs in general-is more appropriately directed to the
legislatures and regulatory bodies of the several states."' 80
Despite the hurdles identified by the Maio court, and that court's dismissal
of the plaintiffs' RICO cause of action, plaintiffs in other circuits have pressed
ahead with their RICO-based managed care litigation. As of this writing,
multiple class actions against MCOs including Aetna, CIGNA, Health Net,
Humana, Prudential, and United,' are pending in the Southern District of
Florida. Similar to Maio, these suits allege, among other causes of action,
violations of ERISA and RICO.1 2 However, unlike Maio, the federal district
court hearing these cases has refused to hold that the injury inherent in "paying
more for insurance coverage than they would have"' 83 necessarily fails to
establish a RICO injury to business or property. The district court, rather than
accept the plaintiffs' invitation to distinguish Maio on the facts before it, chose

172. Maio, 221 F.3d at 483 (quoting Steele v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 36 F.3d 69, 70 (9th Cir.
1994)).
173. Id. at 490; see also Dornberger v. Metro Life Ins. Co., 961 F. Supp. 506, 521
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("Case law does indicate that a plaintiff who is fraudulently induced to enter
into a transaction does not suffer injury within the meaning of [RICO] until the defendant fails
to perform.").
174. Maio, 221 F.3d at 490.
175. Id. at 478-79.
176. Id. at 482 ("While appellees argue that we may affirm the district court's order... on
a variety of grounds, we need address only one issue .... ").
177. Id. at 480 (discussing alternative grounds for the lower court's grant of summary
judgment).
178. Maio, 221 F.3d at 480 (quoting Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 1999 WL 800315, at *2 (E.D. Pa.
1999)).
179. See supra notes 109-21 and accompanying text.
180. Maio, 221 F.3d at 480 (quoting Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 1999 WL 800315, at *2 (E.D. Pa.
1999)).
181. See In re Managed Care Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1314 n.l (S.D. Fla. 2002).
182. Id. at 1314.
183. Id. at 1318.
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to explicitly disagree with and not adopt the reasoning of Maio.'8 4 If the
Eleventh Circuit agrees with the district court, the disagreement will have to be
resolved by the Supreme Court.
While RICO may be a useful tool in the managed care plaintiff's arsenal, it
does not constitute adequate regulation of managed care conflicts of interest. 85'
The statute clearly was not drafted to accomplish such a goal. The requirement
of injury to "business or property," borrowed from the antitrust laws, will bar
recovery for many plaintiffs. The use of the mail fraud predicate offense as the
route of entry into RICO may prevent widespread use of RICO to challenge
physician financial incentives (as opposed to external review procedures and
determinations), since denials of treatment caused by physician financial
incentives may not be communicated through the mails, but instead face to face
in the physician's offices. Indeed, denials of treatment caused by financial
incentives may never be communicated at all,
18 6 but rather may be implemented
without the patient's knowledge or consent.
C. 42 C.F.R. § 417.479
In 1997, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (formerly known
as the Health Care Financing Administration) addressed the issue of physician
financial incentives in its regulation of MCOs contracting with the Medicare and
Medicaid systems. Under current regulations, MCO contracts may not contain
provisions for any "specific payment.., made directly or indirectly.., as an
inducement to reduce or limit medically necessary services furnished to an
individual... .""' In addition to this dubious prohibition, MCOs also may not
enter into contracts with providers that place physicians at "substantial financial
risk" for services not provided directly by the physicians (i.e., for physicians'
referral patterns and hospital utilization rates 88) without providing specific
mandated protections for the physicians and patients under such a contract.
"Substantial financial risk" is defined by the regulations as more than twent,five percent of the physician's income at risk for overuse of referral services.
Plans which place more than twenty-five percent of the physician's income at
risk must provide stop-loss insurance protection against catastrophic medical

184. Id. at 1318. Nonetheless, the court dismissed the majority of plaintiffs' RICO claims
for failure to plead the predicate criminal acts with sufficient particularity. Id. at 1324.
185. At least one writer has called into question the appropriateness of using civil RICO
in the managed care litigation field, arguing that this litigation is merely a sham and a cover for
inappropriate political pressures to force a lucrative settlement, modeled on the recent multistate
settlement of class actions against the tobacco industry. Jensen, supra note 21, at 1364
("[E]xtrajudicial tactics available to plaintiffs and their attorneys... may bring the litigation to
a premature [settlement], denying courts the opportunity to scrutinize the plaintiffs' recovery
theories.").
186. See infra Part IV.
187. Medicare Contract Requirements, 42 C.F.R. § 417.479(a)(1) (2000). Similar language
has been adopted by a number of states. For a critique of this language, see infra Part III.E.
188. Payment methods which address only the services provided by the physician or
physician group are not applicable. See Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Requirements for
Physician Incentive Plans in Prepaid Health Care Organizations, 61 Fed. Reg. 13,430 (March 27,
1996) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1003). Thus, a contract which pays a physician a capitated
rate per month for a fixed patient population, but which does not require the physician to bear
any of the cost of referral or hospitalization services provided to her patients, would not be
regulated by this provision.
189. 42 C.F.R. § 417.479(e).
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expenses19" and must conduct periodic enrollee satisfaction surveys. 91 Finally,
under this regulation, plans must disclose to Medicare beneficiaries upon
request1 92 the type of incentive used, whether stop-loss protection is provided,
and the results of any required enrollee satisfaction surveys. This limited
disclosure requirement clearly falls far short of meeting the ethical requirements
of informed consent. 93 MCOs are not required to inform beneficiaries that they
have a right to even the limited information required to be provided upon
request; only those beneficiaries sophisticated enough and sufficiently informed
to know that they have the right to the information, and sufficiently motivated
to request it, will receive it. Existing regulations are thus flawed on both
procedural and substantive grounds: they fail to provide enough information to

enrollees to satisfy the demands of informed consent doctrine and also fail to
provide enough
substantive protection to enrollees from financial conflicts of
94
interest.1
D. FiduciaryDuty

Although the literature is replete with references to physicians as
"fiduciaries" on behalf of patients,' the precise legal status of physicians as
fiduciaries is not clear.' 96 Courts have been more reluctant than commentators
to label the physician-patient relationship a fiduciary one.' 97 In fact, the term
"fiduciary" is not a monolithic one and can mean different things, and imply
different duties, depending on the context.' 98 The Pegramcase'99 limited MCOs'
ERISA liability for the imposition of financial incentives by deciding that the
ERISA definition of "fiduciary" did not apply to MCO officers making
determinations involving, at least in part, decisions about eligibility for benefits
under an ERISA health plan.

190. This insurance may be provided by purchasing insurance from a commercial insurer,
or by self-insuring through protecting the physician contractually from such losses. However,
the cost of such insurance may not be charged to the physician. 42 C.F.R. § 417.479(g)(2).
191. 42 C.F.R. § 417.479(g)(1).
192. 42 C.F.R. § 417.479(h)(3).
193. See infra Part.IV.
194. See Hall, supra note 17, at 113-14.
195. See RODWIN, supra note 58; Marc A. Rodwin, Physicians-ConflictsofInterest: The
Limitations of Disclosure, 321 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 1405 (1989); Hydraulics, Inc. v. Indus.
Comm'n., 768 N.E.2d 760, 763 (I11.App. Ct. 2002) ("[C]itizens of Illinois have a confidential
and fiduciary relationship with their physicians."); Neurology Code of Professional Conduct,
supra note 61, at 1257 rule 1.2 ("The neurologist has fiduciary and contractual duties to
patients.").
196. M. Gregg Bloche, ClinicalLoyalties andthe SocialPurposesof Medicine, 281 JAMA
268, 273 (1999) ("Remarkably, U.S. health law has not yet widely recognized a duty of
loyalty .... ).
197. In Batas v. PrudentialInsurance Co. of America, 724 N.Y.S.2d 3 (N.Y. App. Div.
2001), the New York Supreme Court Appellate Division refused to characterize the relationship
between an MCO and a beneficiary as fiduciary, reasoning that the insurer had not "sought to
gain [the beneficiary's] trust and confidence," id. at 5, and that an insurance contract alone is not
thought to give rise to fiduciary duties. Id. at 7.
198. See, e.g., In re Hanft, 274 B.R. 917 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2002) (finding that debtor
physician had a fiduciary relationship with patients sufficient to trigger state duties requiring that
he set aside assets or procure medical malpractice insurance to satisfy any malpractice claims);
Neurology Code of ProfessionalConduct, supra note 61, at 1257 rule 1.2 ("As a fiduciary, the
neurologist has an ethical duty to consider the interests of the patient first.").
199. See supra notes 100-27 and accompanying text.
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ERISA is not the only potential source of fiduciary responsibilities for
physicians. State law has recognized a fiduciary relationship between physician
and patient for at least some limited purposes. A physician may have a duty to
disclose the fact that the physician's negligence has caused the patient's injury.
In 2002, in the context of a professional malpractice case, the Supreme Court of
Arizona stated that "[w]e long ago held that a patient and a doctor were in a
fiduciary relationship 'calling for frank and truthful information from' doctor to
patient."200 Fiduciary duties, if recognized, may have components of both
0
and advocacy for patients,...2 abut clearly, managed care
fidelity to patients 2°
limits of the fiduciary label.
the
stretches
practice
Despite limited recognition of a fiduciary component to the physicianpatient relationship, physicians' alleged status as fiduciaries has not been a
fruitful ground for litigation over managed care conflicts of interest. At least one
reason for this may have been the existence of ERISA preemption of state law
claims against MCOs involved in ERISA plans, and to the extent that the
Pegram decision represents a lifting of that preemption doctrine for this
purpose 2, 4 litigation on this theory may increase. One scholar has suggested that
the fiduciary status of physicians might provide a robust doctrine to regulate the
physician-patient relationship.2" 5 Writing in 1990, before the managed care
backlash (indeed, arguably before the managed care revolution), Professor
Maxwell J. Mehlman suggested that the fiduciary status of health care providers
could act as a limiting factor in the wholesale application of market-based
doctrines to the purchase and sale of health care services. Mehlman argued that,
under a contractarian approach, actually very little disclosure is required of the
seller; contract law assumes that the buyer's responsibility is to acquire
information as desired before making a bargain. °6 Mehlman argues that
recognition of a fiduciary relationship will both increase the amount and type of
disclosure that must be made by the health care provider in order to justify
entering into a particular bargain with a consumer 2 7 and provide an underlying
"safety net" proscribing certain types of transactions, regardless of the amount
of disclosure that has been made."
Time will tell whether the partial rejection of ERISA preemption in the
context of managed care incentives will lead to a revitalization of state doctrines
of fiduciary status in the physician-patient relationship. As the ERISA shield has
slipped in recent years, several states have passed laws purporting to specifically
regulate the use of managed care financial incentives. The next section will
survey some of those state laws. However, in light of the overwhelming reliance

200. Walk v. Ring, 44 P.3d 990, 999 (Ariz. 2002) (finding physician's fraudulent
concealment of negligence tolls statute of limitations). But see Gonzalez v. United States, 284
F.3d 281 (1 st Cir. 2002) (refusing to find that mere silence operated as fraudulent concealment).
201. Neurology Code of Professional Conduct, supra note 61, at 1259 rule 5.1 ("The
patient's interest is paramount.").
202. Id. at 1259 rule 5.4 ("The neurologist generally should support the patient's medical
interests when they are compromised by policies of a health care institution or agency.
Physicians .. .should represent their patients' medical interests and serve as their medical
advocate to the institutional administration.").
203. Bloche, supra note 196.
204. See McLean & Richards, supra note 123, at 19.
205. See Maxwell J. Mehlman,FiduciaryContracting:Limitations on Bargaining Between
Patientsand Health Care Providers,51 U. PiTr. L. REv. 365 (1990).
206. Id.at 374-86 ("Disclosure in fact is quite distasteful to the law of contracts.").

207. Id. at 388-93.
208. Id. at 392-99.
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on disclosure as a means of curing the ethical problems with managed care
incentives, it seems unlikely that state laws, including existing fiduciary
doctrines, will provide sufficient protection to health care consumers in the
managed care marketplace.
In response to perceived abuses by MCOs, health care providers have also
attempted to rely on fiduciary duties to hold MCOs accountable. In Humana
Health Plan, Inc. v. Heritage Indiana Medical Group,20 9 a medical group
contracting with Humana attempted to force Humana to provide an equitable
accounting of its performance under the contract. Under Illinois law, in order to
maintain an action for an equitable accounting, a plaintiff must show that
ordinary breach of contract remedies are inadequate to make the plaintiff whole
and "either a breach of a fiduciary relationship, a need for discovery, fraud, or
the existence of mutual accounts which are of a complex nature.""' Heritage
attempted to show that the relationship between the MCO and the medical
practice amounted to a fiduciary relationship or its equivalent."' The court
rejected Heritage's claim on Humana's motion for summary judgment, relying
on the rule of law that a contractual relationship ordinarily is one of arm's length
bargaining, not a relationship of trust and confidence that would give rise to
fiduciary duties, and that Heritage had asserted no facts which would support a
finding of such a relationship of trust and confidence. 1 2 Thus, Heritage was
unable to obtain the equitable remedy of an accounting and was forced to rely
on standard breach of contract doctrine to proceed against Humana." 3
E. State Statutes
In response to the managed care backlash and increasing patient awareness
of and dissatisfaction with physician financial incentives, many states are
considering, or have passed, laws which purport to regulate the financial
incentives contained in physicians' contracts with managed care companies.
These laws are not uniform, and their diversity is no doubt related to the speed
with which they have been enacted."" There is no national model for such
regulation, so states are forced to reinvent the wheel each time one seeks to
enact such legislation. Nonetheless, there are strong similarities among many of
these laws. Although the relationship between these state laws and ERISA is still
not entirely clear, they have recently received a strong boost from the Supreme
21 s and
Court in light of the Pegram
Moran21 6 decisions.

209. No. 99 C 6276, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 2, 2001).
210. Id. at *4 (citation omitted).
211. Heritage actually claimed that the relationship was "similar to that of a fiduciary
duty," but the court treated it as if a fiduciary duty were claimed, reasoning that there is no
"similar to" status in Illinois law. Id. at *9-10.
212. Id. at *8.
213. Id. at *9.
214. Kapp, supra note 32, at 15, 17 (criticizing "inconsistent, uncoordinated, piecemeal
legislative intrusions resulting from separate legislatures hastily succumbing to the most
politically powerful lobbying forces of the moment ... ").
215. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000); supra notes 100-27 and accompanying
text.
216. See Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 122 S. Ct. 2151 (2002); supra notes 128-39
and accompanying text.
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At one end of the regulatory spectrum, many states have no statute
governing physician incentives in managed care contracts. 2 7 These states may
have not yet considered the issue legislatively or may believe that the issue is
already adequately regulated by existing laws at the federal or state level. In the
alternative, a state may have made the political determination that governmental
regulation of managed care contracting is not desirable from a public policy
viewpoint. However, the number of states adopting such laws is ever2
Several states mandate disclosure of financial incentives, either to
increasing. 211
a state regulatory agency 219 or to consumers. 220 In some states, the state regulator
takes on the responsibility of ensuring that the financial incentives used reflect
an appropriate mix of concern for cost containment and protection of the
physician-patient relationship.22'
Other states have responded to the growth and increasing criticism of
managed care financial incentives by attempting to ban such incentives, or at
least certain features of such incentives. For example, an Alaska statute provides
that "[a] health maintenance organization . . . may not cause, request, or
knowingly permit ... financial incentives to be given or offered to a provider for
denying or delaying health care services. 222 Although perhaps well intentioned,
this formulation is ultimately unhelpful. Managed care arose as a response to
perceived abuses in the fee-for-service marketplace, including the incentive
under a fee-for-service payment system to overutilize medical services. In an
217. Even if a state has no law generally applicable to physician financial incentives, it
may have passed a law addressing physician financial incentives in a particular area which the
state has chosen to regulate. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27-48-3 (1996) (barring "any financial
incentive or disincentive ... of any kind or nature ... to encourage or cause early discharge of
a hospital patient from postpartum care...").
218. See ALASKA STAT. § 21.07.010(b)(1) (Michie 2000); ARZ. REV. STAT. § 20-833(D)
(2002); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 511 (2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-20A-6(a) (2000); IDAHO
CODE § 41-3928 (Michie 1997); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:215.19 (West 2003); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 24-A, § 4303(3-b) (West 2002); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-113(b), (c) (2002); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 1760, § 10 (West 2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.3542 (West 2000);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 72A.20(33) (West 1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 354.443 (West 2001); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. 695G.260 (Michie 1998); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2S-5, 26:2S-9 (West 2002);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-3-265 (2001); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-04-03(17) (2002); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 40, § 991.2112 (West 2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17.13-3(b)(8) (2001); TEX. INS. CODE ANN.
§ 843.314 (Vernon 2001); W.VA. CODE ANN. § 33-25C-4(b) (Michie 2002).
219. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5802 (Michie 2002) ("A health carrier, when applying for
initial licensing .... shall identify generally the arrangements that the health carrier has with
providers .... Descriptions... shall include compensation methodology and incentives."); W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 33-25D-10 (Michie 2000) ("[MCOs] shall file with the commissioner any
contracts made with providers .... ).
220. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 9414 (1999) ("A managed care organization shall, in plain
language, disclose to its members .... [t]he financial inducements offered to any health care
provider or health care facility for the reduction or limitation of health care services."). Not all
disclosure requirements are universal. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.43.510(2) (2003)
Upon the request of any person, . . . a carrier must provide written
information regarding any health plan it offers, that includes the
following... (d) A written description of any reimbursement or payment
arrangements, . . . (e) Descriptions and justifications for provider
compensation programs, including any incentives or penalties that are
intended to encourage providers to withhold services or minimize or avoid
referrals to specialists ....
221. In fact, some states seem to positively require financial incentives to limit care. See,
e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-25D-10(a) (2000) ("The commissioner may require the immediate
cancellation.., or the immediate renegotiation of a contract... if he or she determines that a
contract ... fails to include reasonable incentives for cost control .....
222. ALASKA STAT. § 21.86.150(i)(4) (Michie 2002).
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ideal market for health services, the provider will recommend additional services
until the marginal cost of the additional service exceeds the benefit to be
obtained from that service by the patient. In a fee-for-service system, a provider
has an incentive to continue providing services as long as payment for those
services is forthcoming, regardless of the benefit to the patient. If the patient
does not bear financial responsibility for payment, the incentive to overutilize
is exacerbated unless either the insurer exerts some authority over utilization or
the patient suffers other costs (such as inconvenience or discomfort) and
questions the utility of the services being provided. As a response to this known
perverse incentive, a managed care system must impose some limitations on the
extent of care provided. These limitations may be external to the provider, such
as utilization review and pre-authorization procedures. However, external
review systems alone may be insufficient if the providers of services still have
an incentive to game the system so as to increase the amount of services
provided. In addition to external review, most MCOs find it desirable to try to
change the practice patterns of physicians conditioned by decades of fee-forservice incentives. In order for a managed care incentive to have the desired
effect, and in order for it to counteract the perverse incentive of the fee-forservice system, it must by definition provide an incentive to perform fewer
procedures, and provide fewer medical services, than the physician would have
provided under fee-for-service. If the incentive is properly structured, this is a
positive change, as it eliminates the excess services which would have been
provided in a fee-for-service system. Ideally, the physician now has an internal,
self-policing incentive to provide only that care which is both beneficial to the
patient and cost-effective. Seen in this light, the Alaska statutory mandate that
financial incentives must not cause a provider to deny or delay any medical
services, no matter their practical utility to the patient, is a meaningless
limitation which, taken seriously, would limit managed care companies to
external checks and reviews of providers' behavior.
Many state statutes regulating physician financial incentives modify the
Alaska approach by narrowing the field of forbidden financial incentives.
Typical of these statutes is that enacted in Idaho, which provides that "[n]o
managed care organization shall offer a provider ...any incentive plan that
includes a specific payment made... to the provider as an inducement to deny,
reduce, limit, or delay specific, medically necessary, and appropriate services
covered by the health care contract ....
This formulation is different from the Alaska approach in several respects.
It is narrower in that it applies only to specific payments made in exchange for
specific delays or denials of services. This raises a serious question about
whether any alternative payment system adopted by an MCO with the intent to
generally affect physician's referral, hospitalization, or treatment patterns, but
which does not tie specific inducements, such as bonuses or withholds, directly
to specific treatment decisions would be regulated under this statutory
language.224

223. IDAHO CODE § 41-3928 (Michie 1997).
224. In addition, many of these statutes expressly exempt from their reach certain types
of payment systems, such as capitation. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 41-3928(2) (Michie 1997)
("Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit contracts that contain incentive plans that

involve general payments such as capitation payments or shared risk agreements that are not tied
to specific medical decisions ....).
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These state statutes may be useful, but require some judicial gloss on the
statutory language to provide a meaningful reform of MCO contracts.225 Any
and all managed care incentives encourage physicians to limit the care they
would have ordered under a fee-for-service regime. Managed care reformers
hope that incentives are strong enough to prevent physicians from undertaking
treatment which is of no benefit to the patient, but not so strong that they provide
an irresistable incentive to deny care which is of great marginal value. However,
at present there is no calculus to determine the point at which the marginal
benefit to the patient outweighs the cost of the treatment, and consequently,
there is no consensus on the proper strength of these incentives. The only clear
thing is that a managed care incentive, by definition, must affect physician
behavior. If it did not, then there would be no reason for a MCO to implement
the incentive as it would improve neither outcomes nor financial
performance.216 Given that all managed care incentives must encourage
physicians to deny some care, the question remains: What is the proper line of
demarcation between those incentives which encourage fiscal prudence, and
those which lead to unethical and impermissible denials of care? The statutes,
standing alone, do not tell us. If they prohibit all incentives which lead to denial
of care, they are meaningless, as noted above. If they prohibit only those
incentives which lead to denial of medically necessary care, then the question
tums on the definition of "medical necessity," itself a contested concept.227
Absent a statutory definition of medical necessity, plaintiffs will invite courts to
expand the concept to cover any case in which care was denied and a bad
outcome resulted. Courts will face the challenge of balancing the interests of
plaintiffs, who might well have paid for more treatment under a self-paid
system, or certainly demanded more treatment under an indemnity fee-forservice insurance contract, against the interests of the collective pool of insured
lives and the interest of society in affordable health care with adequate coverage
and services. However, the difficulty of the task does not justify avoidance of
it. Courts will need to rise to the challenge of providing a reasonable commonlaw gloss on the statutory prohibition.
Finally, these state statutes purporting to regulate physician financial
incentives are not yet out from under the threat of potential preemption under
ERISA. Although the ERISA shield enjoyed by MCOs is weakening, 228 states
do not have free rein to regulate. Under the recently-announced Moran decision,
state laws providing for independent review ofMCOs' administrative denials of
coverage were denominated the "regulation of insurance" for purposes of
ERISA's savings clause. However, unlike an independent review, direct
regulation of.physician financial incentives might be seen to affect the content
of an ERISA plan, and thus "relate to" an employee benefit plan for purposes of

225. Vikram Khanna et al., Disclosure of Operating Practices by Managed Care
Organizationsto Consumers ofHealthcare: The ObligationsofInformed Consent, 9 J. CLINICAL

ETHics 291, 294 (1998) (noting that existing state statutes "lack key elements of useful
disclosure: a standard format. . . and a broad-enough range of information").
226. Arguably, cost containment should be subjugated to quality as a measure of
incentives' impact. Cf. Ross-Lee et al., supra note 17, at 851 ("Physicians should not pursue less
costly treatment without evidence that the health outcomes or the quality of life will be at least
equal to those achieved with more costly treatment.").
227. See, e.g., 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 134/45 (West 2002) (providing for mandatory

external review of MCOs' determinations that care is not "medically appropriate").
228. See supra notes 74-144 and accompanying text.
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preemption analysis. Definitive determination of this point must await further
elaboration of the Moran ruling.
In addition to state statutes purporting to directly regulate the content of
managed care contracts with physicians, some plaintiffs are seeking to rely on
other state laws to regulate managed care financial incentives. In light of the
diminishing force of ERISA preemption,229 this state avenue may bear fruit in
the near future. Perhaps the most famous state law case holding that a physician
has a fiduciary duty to disclose financial incentives to the patient is Moore v.
230
Regents of the University of California.
Although not a case arising in a
managed care environment, this case has served as background for others arising
in that context, and so merits discussion. Moore was a patient of the University
of California at Los Angeles Medical Center. In treating Moore for hairy-cell
leukemia, the physicians treating Moore became aware that Moore's tissues had
unique characteristics giving them commercial value. The physicians arranged
for Moore's repeated visits to UCLA, assuring him that the visits were necessary
for his treatment, while in fact they were for the benefit of the physicians and the
University who stood to gain from the commercial development of products
derived from Moore's cells and tissues. 21 Upon discovery of this duplicity,
Moore sued on myriad causes of action, including conversion of his tissues and
breach of fiduciary duty for failing to disclose to him the true nature of his extratherapeutic visits to UCLA.232 While the court dismissed Moore's conversion
claim, holding that Moore had no cognizable property interest in his bodily
2 4
233
tissues,

the court held that he had stated a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. 1

In discussing the contours of the physician's fiduciary duty in this context, the
court stated that "a physician who is seeking a patient's consent for a medical
procedure must, in order to satisfy his fiduciary duty and to obtain the patient's
informed consent, disclose personal interests unrelated to the patient's health,
whether research or economic, that may affect his medical judgment." ' 35 The
potential applicability of this holding to managed care financial incentives is
obvious; however, few courts have accepted Moore's invitation to extend such
liability.
In Neade v. Portes23 6 the Illinois Appellate Court relied in part on Moore in
holding that the plaintiff could maintain an action against his physician for
breach of fiduciary duty arising from a failure to disclose managed care
incentives.237 Dr. Portes practiced medicine in a group practice which had a
contract with a Chicago HMO. This contract provided for a capitated payment
as well as a "Medical Incentive Fund." The Medical Incentive Fund would be
used to pay for certain supplemental services and, at the end of the year, any
surplus would be divided among the HMO and the physicians. 238 When Neade
complained of repeated episodes of chest pain, Dr. Portes repeatedly refused to
authorize diagnostic testing, relying on earlier testing to conclude that Neade's
229. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002); Corporate Health Ins. Inc.

v. Tex. Dep't of Ins., 215 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 2000).
230. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
231. Id. at 481.
232. Id. at 482.

233. Id. at 488-89.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Id. at 497.
Id. at 485.
710 N.E.2d 418 (I11.
App. Ct. 1999).
Id. at 427.
Id. at421.
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symptoms were not related to heart disease. When Neade died of myocardial
infarction caused by coronary artery blockage,239 his estate sued, claiming that
Dr. Portes' judgment was affected by his interest in the Medical Incentive Fund
and that, as in Shea, Neade would not have relied on his physician's reassurance
that more services were not needed had he known of the existence of the
incentive. 2" The court of appeals, relying in part on Shea v. Esensten24' and
Moore v. Regents of the University of California, held that a fiduciary
relationship existed, and that a cause of action for breach of that fiduciary
relationship existed independently of any cause of action for malpractice.243
In Hill Physicians Medical Group v. Pacificare2" a group of physicians
sued an MCO under California consumer protection law, alleging that "certain
of Pacificare's business practices.., are unfair business practices... [and] 'are
likely to harm consumers (patients) in that said practices lead to unreasonable
and inappropriate economic pressures on the medical groups ... to limit the
amounts and types of services provided to ... patients ... .""" Pacificare
attempted to remove the case to federal district court under the ERISA statute,
claiming that under ERISA's total preemption doctrine, plaintiffs state law
claims were preempted by ERISA's civil enforcement provisions.246 The district
court disagreed, holding that matters which relate solely to the contract between
physician and MCO could not be asserted by individual beneficiaries of an
insurance plan, do not involve interpretation of an ERISA plan, and do not
"relate to" an ERISA plan so as to trigger preemption and removal.247 In
Ouellette v. The Christ Hospital248 a federal district court determined that a
malpractice claim, which rested in part on the defendant hospital's alleged
financial incentive, under its contract with an MCO to limit care provided, was
not completely preempted by ERISA. The court reasoned that the claim, as a
malpractice claim, "[would] not require review of [the 249
MCO's] utilization
review or otherwise demand construction of the... plan.
IV. ECONOMIC INFORMED CONSENT

As shown in the last section, many of the regulatory responses to physician
conflicts of interest in MCOs rely on mandatory disclosures to "cure" the
conflict of interest and allow the relationship to legally and ethically continue.25 °
This approach reflects the market view of health care in which patients and
physicians are seen as primarily arm's length economic actors."' This section

239. Id.
240. Id. at 422.
241. 107 F. 3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997); see supra notes 81-92 and accompanying text.
242. 793 P. 2d 479 (Cal. 1990); see supra notes 230-35 and accompanying text.
243. Neade, 710 N.E.2d at 429, 431.
244. No. COI-0318 SI, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6051 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2001).
245. Id. at *3 (citations omitted).
246. Id. at *6-7.
247. Id. at *940 (relying on Blue Cross of Cal. v. Anesthesia Care Assocs. Med. Group,
Inc., 187 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1999)).
248. 942 F. Supp. 1160 (S.D. Ohio 1996).
249. Id. at 1165.
250. See William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and
American Health Care,99 COLUM. L. REv. 1701 (1999).
251. See supra notes 8-15 (discussing the "two cultures" of health care).
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will critique the market approach and suggest an alternate view of the regulation
of physician financial incentives.
A. The Theory of Economic Informed Consent
One important thread of scholarship on the physician-patient relationship in
managed care focuses on the doctrine of informed consent and applies it to the
health insurance context. In this view, disclosure of the existence of physician
conflicts of interest at the time of formation of the insurer-insured relationship
allows the consumer of health care services to make a rational choice whether
or not to enter into a relationship characterized by those conflicts. If the
consumer decides that the cost-benefit trade-off justifies the use of physician
financial incentives, then the consumer reaps the benefit of that bargain and
cannot be heard later to complain about the compromises inherent in it.252 This
section will briefly summarize the reasoning of this theory, which, borrowing
a well-turned phrase from Professor Mark Hall, a leading proponent of this
'
theory, I shall call "economic informed consent."253
The fundamental problem answered by economic informed consent is that
of scarcity. Since society cannot afford to provide all marginally beneficial
services and treatments to all patients, some form of cost control must be
imposed. This theory calls for use of informed consent and patient choice as
legal and ethical techniques to manage the conflicts of interest created by
managed care practice. Since financial incentives show promise in affecting
physicians' practice patterns learned under fee-for-service medicine,254 these
incentives are acceptable so long as they are consented to by individual
enrollees.255 In addition, disclosure of the types and operation of financial
incentives at the time of enrollment constitutes legally and ethically defensible
advance consent to individual rationing decisions, which may be adverse to a
specific beneficiary, and waiver of the right to complain of such decisions.256
Such a theory authorizes physicians to make cost-conscious decisions "at the
bedside," that is, to take global resource allocation issues into account when
making choices about how or whether to treat an individual patient. 7

252. See MARK A. HALL, MAKING MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS (1997) [hereinafter
MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS];CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES: PRIVATE
CONTRACTS AS INSTRUMENTS OF HEALTH REFORM (1995); Mark A. Hall, A Theory of Economic
Informed Consent, 31 GA. L. REv. 511 (1997) [hereinafter Economic Informed Consent]; E.

Haavi Morreim, Medicine Meets Resource Limits: Restructuringthe Legal Standardof Care,

59 U. PITT. L. REV: 1 (1997).

253. See Economic Informed Consent, supra note 252. This brief synopsis necessarily
simplifies and streamlines the robust arguments offered by these scholars, and collapses
distinctions among them. Note that some of those who agree with the thesis will no doubt
disagree with some of the details as I present them.
254. Bloche, supra note 196, at 271.
255. MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS, supra note 252, at 213-14.

256. Id. at 211 ("[E]nrolling with an HMO constitutes blanket advance consent to the
subsequent denials of marginally beneficial care brought about by the rules ....
disclosed at the
outset.").
257. Making allocation decisions "at the bedside" is a controversial practice disfavored by
many commentators, who insist that although a physician may engage in policy-making global
resource allocation debate (and, indeed, that medical expertise is valuable to such a debate), her
clinical responsibilities must be to the individual patient before her. See Robert M. Veatch, DRGs
andthe EthicalReallocation ofResources, 16 HASTINGS CTR. REPORT 32, 37-39 (1986); Daniel
P. Sulmasy, Physicians,Cost Control, and Ethics, 116 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 920 (1992)
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The use of informed consent or contractarian doctrine to provide the
impetus for cost consciousness in clinical decision making relies on predicates
that are not present in the managed care market at the present time and do not
appear likely to be adopted, either through legal mandate or voluntary industry

action, in the foreseeable future.25 These predicates are disclosure of the nature
and effects of the proposed financial incentives2.

products.2 6'

9

and consumer choice among

a full range of health insurance
Disclosure and consumer choice are
necessary2 6' in order for consumers' decisions to subscribe to a particular
managed care plan, with its attendant restrictions and incentives, to be both fully
voluntary and informed 262 and to represent a bargained-for exchange of lower
premiums and other benefits of the managed care program for acceptance of
those restrictions and incentives.263

("[B]oth bedside rationing and restrictive gatekeeping are morally illegitimate roles for the
physician."); Shortell et al., supranote 51, at 1103 (noting that historically, physicians have been
"relatively isolated from the examination of" the tension between social welfare and individual
patients' welfare, "being asked to be an individual patient advocate rather than a social
planner"); Schwartz, supra note 4, at 126 ("[W]ithin a patient-care giver relationship the
physician must be an unabashed advocate for his or her patient."); Winters et al., supra note 50,
at 11; Woolhandler & Himmelstein, supra note 26. Alternatives which remove allocation
decisions from the individual bedside are use ofprofessional practice guidelines and communitybased decisionmaking, both of which are considered and rejected by Professor Hall. See
MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS, supra note 252, at 122-24 (discussing the practice of the
rationing of medical resources "at the bedside").
258. Sage, supra note 250, at 1720 ("Despite the theoretical appeal of using disclosure to
improve transactional efficiency, several ways in which health care differs from other purchases
belie the apparent simplicity of this regulatory mission.").
259. Below, I argue that even if full disclosure offinancial incentives is made, it would be
insufficient to cure the ethical problems with such incentives for several reasons. See infra Part
IV.A.4.
260. See, e.g., Morreim, supra note 252, at 47 nn.149-166 and accompanying text
(discussing "[c]onditions for [e]ffective [c]ontracting"); Economic Informed Consent,supranote
252, at 556-81 (discussing consumer choice issues under the economic informed consent theory).
261. Bloche, supra note 196, at 271 ("[W]hether a woman who joins an HMO thereby
consents to her physician's subsequent refusal to approve a mammogram cannot be answered
without prior moral judgments about the adequacy of her health insurance options and the
minimum acceptable level of subscriber knowledge about the HMO's coverage policies.").
262. Kapp, supra note 32, at 15, 16 ("Valid informed consent... depend[s] on the patient
being adequately told relevant details pertaining to reasonable alternatives."). Interestingly, in
another context, the Supreme Court has held that valid "[c]onsent ... can happen without
knowledge of the available options." Marc L. Miller & Ronald Wright, The Right to Refuse
Searches Is in Danger,L.A. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2002, at B 11(citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218 (1973) (holding no federal constitutional requirement to inform citizens ofthe right
to refuse consent for a requested search)). Although the Fourth Amendment does not apply to
the physician-patient relationship, cases such as this one raise interesting questions about the
lengths to which courts might go to enforce the health care consumer's right to full information
before consenting to a limitation on the physician-patient relationship.
263. MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS, supra note 252, at 193 ("If patients are not informed
of these incentives, or are given no choice over whether to accept them, the foundational consent
is ... undermined."); Parmley et al., supra note 30, at 8.
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1. No Disclosure
Disclosure is a prerequisite to economic informed consent. 26 Without full
disclosure of the nature of the physician-patient relationship presented by the
managed care bargain, the choice of that bargain by the health care consumer
cannot be said to be fully informed 265 and cannot represent a free choice and
conscious bargain. An example of such a managed care bargain could improve
less physician advocacy in cases of denial of care by the third party payor in
exchange for lower premiums and deductibles.266 Industry and government data
clearly show that the disclosures, if any, made in the current market do not rise
to the level of informed consent. 67 Current regulations do not require adequate
levels of disclosure, and the industry has not voluntarily provided adequate

disclosure.2 6' Further, there is little likelihood of legal reform to implement
disclosure. The best chance of regulation to implement widespread disclosure
would be by means of the "Patients' Bill of Rights" legislation currently under
consideration by Congress. Unfortunately, there are at least two problems with
that avenue of reform. First, as of this writing, it is unclear when, if ever,
decisive action will be taken on any federal patients' rights legislation. Although
this legislation has from time to time captured the mind of the public and
passage has appeared imminent, the current status is very much unclear.
Patients' rights were understandably far from Congress's immediate agenda
after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and despite murmurings from
Capitol Hill, there has been no concerted effort to return to this issue in the near
future.2 69 Second, even if Congress did once again take up patients' rights
legislation, broad-based disclosure is unlikely to be part of the mandate
contained in that bill.270

264. William C. Wu & Robert A. Pearlman, Consent in Medical Decision Making: The
Role of Communication,3 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 9, 9 (1988) ("Informed consent requires that
pertinent information be disclosed to the patient .... );see also Joseph C. Gambone & Robert
C. Reiter, Hysterectomy: Improving the Patient'sDecision-Making Process, 40 CLINICAL
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 868,869 (1997) (discussing a study conducted by Wu and Pearlman

studying the elements of communication that should occur during informed consent).
265. Parmley et al., supra note 30, at 9 ("[P]atients cannot express truly informed
preferences or informed refusals until they are provided with sufficient information .... ").
266. Holleman et al., supra note 28, at 351 (noting informed consent under managed care
requires at least that "patients ... understand the limited nature of the options available to them
under the plan and the conflicts of interest facing physicians..."). The authors' view of the
appropriate scope of disclosure to satisfy this requirement is unclear, since they continue that
"patients who ask (should] be told the financial and other non-medical incentives to limit or
control their care .... Id. (emphasis added).
267. See Clarence H. Braddock, III et al., Informed Decision Making in Outpatient
Practice,282 JAMA 2313 (1999); Khanna et al., supra note 225, at 291.
268.
QUALITY

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CONSUMER HEALTH CARE INFORMATION:

COMMISSION

DISCLOSURE

RECOMMENDATIONS

ARE NOT CURRENT

MANY

PRACTICE

GAO/HEHS-98-137, at 3-4 (1998) [hereinafter GAO REPORT] ("[I]nformation that the
Commission recommended be provided about the business relationships and financial
arrangements among health professionals, health care facilities, and health plans... are among
the items not routinely reported to consumers."); Blum, supra note 12, at 605 (discussing that
MCOs have implemented patient rights only as a result of governmental regulation).
269. See Deputy Secretary of Health and Human Services Claude Allen, Address at the
American Association of Health Plans, 2002 Policy Conference (Feb. 26, 2002).
270. The Senate version of the current patients' rights bill does not mention physician
incentives as information that must be disclosed to beneficiaries, either sua sponte (section
121(b)) or upon request (section 121(c)). See Patients' Bill of Rights Act of 2001, S.889, 107th
Cong. (2001). The House version, H.R. 2315, contains substantially the same disclosure
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2. Insufficient Choice
A second barrier to economic informed consent is the lack of actual choice
" ' Realistic choices available to
available to American health care consumers.27
American consumers under managed care are shrinking rather than expanding.
A full panoply of insurance options would be necessary in order for consumer
choices to be good evidence of preferences and thus binding on an advance
consent theory; unfortunately, this is not likely. Employers are placing an
increasing share of the premium burden on employees" and are tending to offer
only one or a limited palette of insurance options. Even if non-MCO options
were available to health care purchasers, their price alone might make their
purchase prohibitively expensive, thus providing the consumer with a Hobson's
choice rather than a meaningful choice. As long as this trend continues, it is
impossible to say that a health care consumer's choice of plan represents a
reasoned bargain to accept economic incentives and conflicts of interest in
exchange for lower premiums.
The lack of choice as to fundamental aspects of one's health care leads to
"clinical captivity" and can amplify both the patient's transference reactions to
the physician and the physician's countertransference reactions to the patient.273
Even if certain employers do offer a relatively complete palette of health
insurance options to their employees, those employees are often not in a position
to effectively exercise the choices open to them. 274 Although there has been
advocacy for consumer choice as a cost-containment mechanism, 275 the current
state of the health care system does not appear to offer sufficient avenues for
consumer choice to satisfy this requirement for a contractarian, choice-based
approach to regulation of physician financial incentives.
In addition to the problems of lack of disclosure and choice, which are
admitted by proponents of economic informed consent, disclosure and contract
as tools to cure physician conflicts of interest also suffer from other potential
problems, including issues of formalism, timing, scope, and effectiveness. The
next section will consider these problems.

provisions as the Senate version and contains a provision calling for study on the effects of
physician payment mechanisms "on physician behavior with respect to the provision of medical
care to patients, including whether and how such arrangements affect the quality of patient care
and the ability of physicians to provide care that is medically necessary and appropriate."
Patients' Bill of Rights Act of 2001, H.R. 2315, 107th Cong. § 122(a)(2)(B) (2001).
271. MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS, supra note 252, at 248 ("[A]ssumptions of free and

informed insurance selection are undermined by large and obvious defects in insurers' actual
disclosure practices ... and the range of actual choice available in existing . . . insurance
system."); Harold J. Bursztajn & Archie Brodsky, Captive Patients,Captive Doctors: Clinical
Dilemmas and Interventions in Caringfor Patientsin Managed Health Care, 21 GEN. Hosp.
PSYCHIATRY 239, 240-41 (1999) (finding a lack of choice of plan for many and a lack of choice

of provider as part of managed care cost-containment protocols).
272. See Colleen Galambos, Resolving Ethical Conflicts in a Managed Health Care
Environment, 24 HEALTH & SOC. WORK 191, 191 (1999).
273. Bursztajn & Brodsky, supra note 271.

274. Ross-Lee et al., supra note 17, at 851 ("When patients do have a choice between plans
or providers, they often lack relevant information about quality measures .... ).
275. See Arti Kaur Rai, RationingThrough Choice: A NewApproach to Cost-Effectiveness
Analysis in Health Care, 72 IND. L.J. 1015 (1997).
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3. Formalism and Informed Consent
A difficulty with the use of informed consent as a cure for financial conflicts
of interest in managed care is the danger of formalism in informed consent
procedures. Although much of the medical literature emphasizes the need to
engage in an ongoing informed consent dialogue in order to ensure the patient's
understanding and participation and to preserve the patient's autonomy interest,
the financial pressures of managed care tend to reduce the time available for this
informed consent dialogue. The informed consent process is reduced to a rote
signature on a form, which is usually pre-prepared by MCO executives or
lawyers and is neither read nor understood by the patient or the physician.276
Formal procedures have their benefits. Formal procedures in the medical
encounter can reassure worried patients, as a form carries with it the assurance
of certainty and repeatability. A formal requirement of informed consent could
serve as a signal to the patient that her consent is significant and could
encourage closer attention to and participation in the informed consent
process." Certainly the formality of a signed informed consent document
removes some uncertainty over exactly what was disclosed to the patient in the
unfortunate event of litigation over an unexpected bad outcome. However, in
order to capture the benefits of formality, the system must take care to avoid a
procedure which reduces the formality to a mere rote act, devoid of substantive
meaning for the participants, particularly the patient.278
4. Limitations of Scope
When a physician discloses a known complication of a proposed procedure
or course of treatment to a patient, the patient then has the authority and, by
virtue of the legal effect of the disclosure, the responsibility to determine
whether or not to accept the proposed procedure or course of treatment,
presumably weighing in the balance both the benefits to be gained and the risks

276. Warren Lee Holleman et al., Continuity of Care, Informed Consent, and Fiduciary
Responsibilitiesin For-ProfitManaged Care Systems, 9 ARCHIVES OF FAM. MED. 21,22 (2000)
("Contrary to a common misconception, the requirements of informed consent are not met by
having the patient sign a paper authorizing a test or treatment."); Jan Marta, A Linguistic Model
of Informed Consent, 21 J. OF MED. & PHIL. 41, 46 (1996) ("Most research on informed
consent... has largely ignored the problem of a hollow consent, one that may lack meaning for
the persons involved, even while retaining medicolegal validity."); Vida Foubister, Physicians
Seldom Tell Patients Enough, AM. MED. NEWS, Jan. 17, 2000, at 9, 9 ("'Even though there may
be a signed consent form,... the process that leads up to [consent] may be inadequate."').
277. Marshall B. Kapp, Managed Care and MandatoryMovies, 276 JAMA 1023, 1023
(1996) (expressing that educational informed consent requirement of MCO "improve[d] my
sense of medical well-being, my feelings of autonomy and control, and the strength of my
relationship with my physician").
278. Foubister, supranote 276, at 10 ("Doctors tend to think of informed consent in legal,
rather than ethical, terms."). Further, the prerequisites of informed consent are lacking. As noted
above, supra notes 264-70 and accompanying text, patients currently do not have access to full

information regarding their medical care. Further, even when engaged in obtaining informed
consent, physicians may not provide ethically optimal levels of disclosures. Wu & Pearlman,
supra note 264, at 11 fig. I (Physicians provide the rationale for the proposed treatment only 43%
of the time and disclose the risks and alternatives to the proposed treatment only 14% and 12%
of the time, respectively.).
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which must be accepted in order to realize those benefits.27 9 However, a
physician's economic conflicts of interest do not relate to a specific proposed
treatment or procedure, but rather to the physician-patient relationship as a
whole. If a particular economic incentive does in fact have an effect on the
physician's judgment with respect to a particular patient's treatment, that
incentive must be taken into account by the patient with respect to every
recommendation made by the physician. The ultimate effect of the conflict of
interest may not be apparent to the patient at the time informed consent
disclosure is given.
Ordinarily, when a patient is given informed consent disclosure, the patient
has a choice whether or not to accept the proposed procedure, with its attendant
risks, in order to attain the desired benefit. If the physician's economic
incentives are treated as an informed consent problem, the patient may not have
this choice for at least two reasons. First, the patient may have no meaningful
choice among providers.28 ° If all providers in a particular managed care network
are subject to the same economic conflict of interest, there can be no meaningful
choice among them based on this factor. If all insurers in a particular market
employ the same or similar economic incentives to control health care costs, the
patient's meaningful choices are reduced further. The patient may be faced with
a limited choice of insurers, as for example when a limited number of insurers
or a single insurer provide health coverage for all employees of a large
employer.2"' As employers continue to shift more and more of the costs of
health insurance onto the worker, workers are potentially forced into lower-cost,
incentive-laden health plans.2" 2 Second, as noted above, the economic incentive,
assuming its efficacy at controlling health care costs and thus implicitly at
controlling the behavior of the physician, colors all choices made by the
physician on behalf of her patient. This may mean that higher cost choices are
simply never recommended to the patient."' The choice of whether or not to
accept a lower-cost treatment option is not a fully informed choice unless the
patient is made aware of all treatments that the physician would ordinarily
recommend, in the absence of the economic incentive. If the physician would
ordinarily recommend a higher-cost treatment, but neglects to do so in the face
of a particular economic incentive, the patient ordinarily has no way of
adequately evaluating the physician's advice, even if the patient is fully aware
of the economic incentive under which the physician is operating.

279. But see Robert T. Brodell, Ethics and Micromanaged Care, 132 ,ARCHIVES OF
DERMATOLOGY 1013 (1996) (describing a situation in which a patient was forced by a managed
care pharmaceutical formulary to endure a four month trial of a covered medication, which the
treating physician knew to be ineffective, before the MCO would pay for treatment with a
noncovered medication which was effective, and questioning the appropriateness of this
treatment, even in the presence of clear and unequivocal informed consent from the patient).
280. Thompson, supra note 59, at 575 (A patient receiving disclosure "may not.., have
reasonable alternative courses of action."); Jeffrey Brainard, The Ties That Bind?, CHRON. OF
HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 8, 2000, at A3 I.
281. Employees are receiving fewer choices in health coverage. See infra note 283 and
accompanying text. But see Khanna et al., supra note 225, at 292 (discussing that disclosure

helps even those with limited choice of health plan, since it gives them an incentive to negotiate
with their employers for a better plan).
282. Reuters Health, supra note 27 (stating that workers are being asked to shoulder a
greater than proportional increase in health insurance costs).
283. Marc A. Rodwin, Conflicts in Managed Care, 332 NEW ENG. J. MED. 604,605 (1995)
("Implicit methods of restricting services ... hide from patients their limited choices.").
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Limitations of Timing

Must informed consent disclosure be given at the beginning of every
physician-patient encounter or is one blanket disclosure, given at the beginning
of the physician-patient relationship, sufficient to cure the conflict of interest? 2
If disclosure is given at the beginning of every physician-patient encounter, the
disclosure may become a routine part of the physician office visit and lose
whatever warning power it may possess 2. ' Excessive repetition of a warning
will dilute the effectiveness of the warning. On the other hand, a blanket
disclosure given at the beginning of the physician-patient relationship may be
insufficien86 for both timing and structural reasons. With respect to timing, the
patient may not be in a position to appreciate the nature and the fact of the
physician's economic incentive or its effect on the physician-patient
relationship.287 Since most health insurance is provided through employers,
unions, or other large groups, a blanket disclosure would likely not come from
the ph sician herself, but would be provided as part of a package of documents
provied by the insurer (or, more likely, by the employer, union, or other group
representative acting as agent of the insurer), and thus might lack the moral
authority of a warning coming directly from the physician.
6. Limitations ofEffectiveness
"The greatest problem in communication is the illusion that it
has been accomplished."
-George Bernard Shaw
Scholars have raised serious questions about the efficacy of informed
consent even in its ordinary manifestations.2 " These questions must be asked
again when proposals are put forward to expand the doctrine of informed
consent to cover physicians' economic incentives. If patients tend to
unconsciously discount disclosed risk factors and focus solely on the perceived
benefits of the recommended course of treatment, will this defect in informed
consent not be all the more pronounced when, as is true in the case at hand, the
risks are theoretical and abstract rather than physical and concrete? 289 Will a
patient, at the time treatment is required, be in an appropriate frame of mind to
perform the required balancing of costs and benefits when weighing the advice

284. Khanna et al., supra note 225, at 293 (suggesting that consent must be obtained at the
time of purchase of insurance, as disclosure at the point of care is too late, but that "general
disclosures by MCOs ... do not discharge physicians from their duty to ensure an informed
consent process at the point of care... ").
285. See supra notes 276-78 and accompanying text (discussing formalism in informed
consent).

286. Rodwin, supra note 283, at 605 ("Unless they are already ill,... most people are
unable to predict what services they will need-a fact that undermines meaningful choice....").
287. Thompson, supra note 59, at 575 ("A deficiency of disclosure is that those who
receive [it] may not know how to interpret it .... ).
288. Marta, supra note 276, at 42 (arguing that the disclosure model of consent "fails to
consider the complexity of any act of communication, and the potential for
misunderstandings...").
289. Bloche, supra note 196, at 273 ("Expectations engendered by bedside empathy persist

despite cognitive input to the contrary, especially when anxious patients yearn to believe.");
Shortell et al., supra note 51, at 1102 (stating that trust in one's doctor is needed by a patient
because of a relative lack of medical knowledge).
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of a physician operating under an economic incentive?29 ° Will widespread
disclosure of the use of economic incentives to manage physician behavior lead
to an impairment of the therapeutic relationship of trust between physician and
patient, 29 and result in a lower level of patient compliance with physician
instructions and thus a reduction in the quality of health care outcomes? 292 Dr.
M. Gregg Bloche argues that the "message of fidelity" inherent in the doctorpatient relationship means that consent to breaches of that fidelity is
problematic, given that patients simultaneously receive other, perhaps nonverbal, information that leads them to expect fidelity from their physician.293
B. Inadequacy ofLitigation as a Vehicle for Regulation
Even if mandated disclosure were enough to cure the conflicts of interest
generated by managed care, litigation is an inappropriate vehicle for imposition
of that mandate. Litigants often ask for mandated disclosure of financial
incentives as a remedy. This quest for court-imposed mandated disclosure
requirements has been at best partially successful.294 However, even when
successful, questions remain about the efficacy of court-imposed mandated
disclosure requirements. Although litigation may have benefits for patients in the
managed care experience, 95 the courts ultimately may not be the best vehicle for
regulation of physician financial incentives. 96
1.

Compliance Concerns

It is important that a mandatory disclosure requirement be readily
enforceable without undue burden on the beneficiaries of a managed care
contract. A disclosure requirement imposed as a function of state common law
will require enforcement by litigation if managed care companies fail to disclose
voluntarily or if the content, form, or timing of the disclosure fails to meet
minimum acceptable standards. Adoption of a disclosure requirement by a state
supreme court is no guaranty of immediate adoption of disclosure practices by
all of a state's MCOs, and repetitive and expensive litigation would be necessary
to bring stragglers into compliance, even if the precedent requiring disclosure
is clear and binding. There would be no effective way to sanction those MCOs
who choose not to comply with the law until forced to do so by patient litigation;
a civil judgment is not binding on nonparties, and so contempt citations would

290. See infra notes 314-17 (patients must trust their doctors due to patients' vulnerable
and desperate state when ill).
291. Shortell et al., supra note 51, at 1103.
292. See, e.g., Feldman et al., supra note 45, at 1628 fig.5 (reporting that forty-nine percent
of surveyed physicians believed that managed care infrequently achieves improved patient
outcomes, as opposed to thirteen percent believing that managed care frequently achieves
improved outcomes.) But see Economic Informed Consent, supra note 252, at 546-49 (arguing
that, empirically, disclosure seems to have no effect on or enhance trust).
293. Bloche, supra note 196, at 273 ("The promise of fidelity signaled by sustained,
empathic engagement is painfully at odds with the reality of a double agenda .... Disclosure
of this dual role.., hardly dispenses with the problem of infidelity.").
294. See supra notes 230-49 and accompanying text.
295. See Cerminara, supra note 72, 9-10.
296. Kapp, supra note 32, at 15 ("Litigating substantial numbers of individual.., claims
in multiple jurisdictions, probably with inconsistent results, would be an... unsatisfactory way
to establish policy guidelines for patient rights and provider responsibilities.").
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not be available for failure to comply with an articulated disclosure requirement.
The remote threat of punitive damages might provide some incentive for
compliance, but it is far from certain. Without an effective scheme of sanctions,
and depending on private litigation for enforcement, MCOs might choose to
delay compliance until forced to comply by the threat of litigation. The burden
of enforcement would then rest solely on the individually wronged patient, who
might have neither the resources nor the inclination to fight protracted litigation
in order to secure her rights. Since research shows that few injured patients
actually bring negligence actions, one might reason by analogy that few patients
wronged by MCO nondisclosure practices will sue, even if there is clear
precedent giving them the right to do so.
2. Legal Process Concerns
Some courts have been reluctant to address the issue of mandatory
disclosure of physician financial incentives due to legal process concerns. These
courts have articulated the belief that the court system is not the proper forum
for resolution of the policy debate over mandatory disclosure and have
suggested that litigants who seek this relief should address their concerns to
Congress rather than to the courts. The highest court to express this concern is
the U.S. Supreme Court. Justice David Souter, writing for the unanimous Court
in Herdrich v. Pegram,297 based the Court's holding, limiting the role of the
federal judiciary in deciding managed care benefit cases, in part on the argument
that decisions about the proper scope of physician incentives should not be made
in the courts.298
3. PoliticalConcerns
To the extent that litigation to establish or enforce a mandatory disclosure
requirement is conducted by state attorneys general under theirparens patriae
power to protect the interests of the citizens of the state, some of the concerns
about the cost and undue burden of litigation may be ameliorated. However,
enforcement by state attorneys general brings with it other concerns. Different
state attorneys general may have different levels of expertise, funding, and
desire to carry out this sort of consumer protection litigation, and these factors
may be subject to dramatic change. In Texas, Attorney General Dan Morales,
a Democrat, filed landmark actions against several MCOs operating in Texas,
alleging that their practices violated a Texas state law against financial
incentives that induce physicians to deny needed care. While the litigation was
pending, Morales lost an election and was replaced by John Comyn, a
Republican. Shortly thereafter, the litigation was transferred from the Consumer
Protection division of the Attorney General's office to the Financial Litigation
division. The action against two of the MCOs was settled on terms which are

297. 530 U.S. 211 (2000).

298. Id. at 221 ("[Sluch complicated factfinding and such a debatable social judgment are
not wisely required of courts unless for some reason resort cannot be had to the legislative
process, with its preferable forum for comprehensive investigations and judgments of social
value....").
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arguably less than favorable to the state's consumers of health care,299 and the
pending litigation against the remaining MCO defendants has been suspended
indefinitely by agreement between the parties.
C. The Argument from Personhood
1. Informed Consent,MarketInalienability,andPhysicianIncentives
If health care can be understood alternatively as a marketplace and as an
ethical profession,300 the managed care revolution, as well as the current
scholarly trend towards economic informed consent and contractarian
approaches to patient protection, reflects the market concept of the health care
system.3' That is, it is assumed that the physician, patient, and MCO are each
free to enter into or to reject any proposed transaction, and that no party has the
ability to exercise effective coercion or power over any other. In this idealized
marketplace, exchanges are made that maximize the value received by all
parties, and the sum of all healthcare transactions result in the highest possible
utility to society. This section will suggest an alternative conception, grounded
in the competing vision of health care as an ethical profession. If, as I suggest,
disclosure and bargaining alone cannot cure managed care conflicts of interest,
how do we justify regulatory limits on the rights of patients and providers to
contract among themselves for the appropriate level of care to be delivered? I
suggest here that one possible answer is found in the doctrine of partial noncommodification, or market-inalienability, articulated by Professor Margaret
Jane Radin. 30 2 For Professor Radin, market-inalienability means that a thing
should not be sold30 3 or bargained away in the marketplace;30 4 that is, it should
not be reduced to a commodity.3 5
In our capitalist society, the marketplace is a primary metaphor by which we
understand the world. How, then, do we justify removing a thing from the
operation of the marketplace? Professor Radin argues that the answer is related
to the nature of the thing itself. A marketplace operates by reducing the value of
things to a common denominator, usually monetary worth. Commodification
inherently assumes that a thing's value can be calculated in money to facilitate
evaluation of particular exchanges. However, some things may be
incommensurate with monetary value; that is, their worth cannot, or should not,
be expressed in dollars and cents. Professor Radin holds that things which are

299. George Lardner, Jr., Aetna Settles Managed-CareLawsuit in Texas, WASH. POST, Apr.
12, 2000, at El (noting that the settlement "imposes no fines or sanctions" on the insurers).
300. See supra notes 8-15 (discussing the "two cultures" of health care).
301. Blum, supra note 12, at 605 ("[G]overnment has been replaced in some areas as the
primary force in shaping . . . health markets by dominant managed care plans . . . whose
policies ... are motivated by the demands of purchasers .... ").
302. Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability,100 HARv. L. REv. 1849 (1987).
303. Id. at 1853 ("[N]onsalability is what I refer to as market-inalienability.").
304. Examples used by Professor Radin are human sexuality, which under current law
cannot be the subject of explicit market transactions, but may be freely exchanged, and the
adoption market, in which human children cannot be bought and sold, but may be freely given
for adoption. Id. at 1921-36.
305. Commodification includes not only the practice of "buying and selling, but also
market rhetoric, the practice of thinking about interactions as if they were sale transactions, and
market methodology, the use of monetary cost-benefit analysis to judge these interactions." Id.
at 1859.
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inextricably related to our humanity - our personhood - should be outside the
scope of the market.30 6 Thinking about our humanity in market terms produces,
in Radin's words, an "inferior concept of human flourishing" and therefore
causes injury to our concepts of ourselves30 7 and our society.'
Ifthe managed care industry is a true marketplace, what is being traded? We
can think of the managed care financial incentives "deal" as a tradeoff of lower
health premiums (and, perhaps, increased attention to preventive care) in
exchange for limited choice of provider and imposition of oversight and cost
control mechanisms, potentially including physician rationing of medical
resources at the bedside.30 9In other words, patients are giving up their traditional
expectation under a fee-for-service medical system that their physician will
provide care with an eye to the patient's benefit alone, in exchange for lower
cost and, depending on the specific managed care plan and representations
made, increased quality of care. However, as we have seen, in this health care
transaction there is no realistic right to refuse the bargain offered." There may
be no other meaningfully distinct insurance options offered by one's employer,
and going outside the group health market to the individual insurance market
may be prohibitively expensive. Even if options are available, the difference
between those options and the lower-cost options may not have been adequately
explained.
Although the market has failed to adequately regulate the physician-patient
relationship under managed care, for Radin, removal of a thing from the market
does not depend on a conclusion that the market has failed to effectively allocate
that thing.3 ' It is enough that the thing in question is closely related to our
concept of ourselves as persons. In the case of the physician-patient relationship,
both conditions are satisfied. The provision of health care services, and in
particular the doctor-patient relationship, is related to our conceptions of
personhood in important ways.3 12 Health care, indeed health itself, is regarded
as a basic human right by the Constitution of the World Health Organization.3" 3
The doctor-patient relationship is fundamentally a relationship of trust and
confidence, not a business or commercial transaction.315 Since our physician

306. Id. at 1885.

307. Id. at 1884. "Systematically conceiving of personal attributes as fungible objects is
person." Radin, supra note 302, at 1881.
308. Radin, supra note 302, at 1879 (using the example of discussing the criminality of
rape interms of a "marriage and sex market").
309. See, e.g., MORREIM, supra note 5, at 80-81; MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS, supranote
threatening to personhood, because it detaches from the person that which is integral to the

252, at 122-24.

310. See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
311. Radin, supra note 302, at 1863-70. Market failure is a precondition for inalienability
for many theorists. Id.
312. See generally PERSONHOOD & HEALTH CARE (David C. Thomasma et al. eds., 2001)
(providing a variety of discussions on the nature of the human person as related to health care,

medicine, and mental health).

313. "Governments have a responsibility for the health of their peoples which can be fulfilled only
by the provision of adequate health and social measures." CONST. OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORG. pmbl.,

availableathup://poicy.who.int/g-bin/omi5api.dl?infobase=Basidoc&sofpage=Brwse-FmmePg42
(last visited Jan. 20, 2003).
314. Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 801 (N.D. Ohio 1965)
("When a patient seeks out a doctor ... he must admit him to the most private part of the

material domain of man.").

315. Ralph Crawshaw et al., Patient-PhysicianCovenant, 273 JAMA 1553, 1553 (1995).
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sees us at our most vulnerable,316 and since complete honesty and candor is
necessary for successful treatment, a successful relationship with our physician
is necessary for our self-actualization as persons.
Although not easily quantified or measured, trust is essential to the

physician-patient relationship. Trust requires that the patient believe that "her
31 7
health is the primary concern of the health care professional caring for her."

However, managed care financial incentives threaten to raise issues of cost
containment or limitation of care to a level equal to or higher than the health of

the individual patient in an individual clinical encounter. Although traditional
statements of physician ethics clearly place the patient at the center of the
phycisian's ethical obligations,319 we cannot rely solely on aspirational ethical
goals to regulate the physician-patient relationship in managed care. Although
many commentators state that the physician's ethical duty is to avoid or reject
unacceptable managed care contract terms,32 ° the vulnerability of individual
physicians to the market power of managed care organizations makes it
untenable to expect physicians to refuse to participate on less than ethical terms,
at great personal loss to themselves. 32' The recognition of the physician's duty
to refuse unethical contract terms implies that consent is insufficient to cure
certain conflicts; 322 that there are conflicts that raise sufficient doubt about the
physician-patient relationship, and that the better course of action is to avoid the
conflict altogether, by prohibition if need be.323
Given the importance of a doctor-patient relationship characterized by trust,
honesty, and beneficence, should that relationship, or certain incidents of it, be
325
market-inalienable? 324 In particular, should patients be permitted to "sell,

316. Shortell et al., supra note 51, at 1102 ("[The] trust[] relationship arises from the
relative disparity in medical knowledge . . and the psychological vulnerability of patients
concerned about their illness or health status."); Bloche, supra note 196, at 272 ("[T]he
physician's infidelity violates another, often when the other is most vulnerable. The ethic of
clinical fidelity safeguards an intimate sphere of personality against such violation.")
317. Gates, supra note 18, at 233.
318. Edmund D. Pellegrino, Allocation of Resources at the Bedside: The Intersectionsof
Economics, Law, and Ethics, 4 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 309, 311-13 (1994).
319. See, e.g., Winters et al., supra note 50, at 11 (finding that the physicians's primary
ethical obligation is to her patient); AM. MED. Assoc. COUNCIL ON MED. SERVS., PRINCIPLES OF
MANAGED CARE 7 (4th ed. 1999) ("The first duty of physicians must be to the individual patient.
This obligation must override considerations of the reimbursement mechanism or specific
financial incentives .... "). Even certain of those commentators, who argue that some level of
cost-consciousness "at the bedside" is desirable, often re-state the obligation to advocate on
behalf of specific patients. Cf Kapp, supra note 32, at 15, 17.
320. Holleman et al., supra note 28, at 351 ("Individual physicians should refuse to join
managed-care organisations if these contracts include unethical gag orders.").
321. Gates, supra note 18, at 234 ("Physicians ... find themselves increasingly vulnerable
to financial pressure as reimbursements decrease and job security wanes."); Chervenak et al.,
supra note 6, at 524 (arguing that economic self-interest forces physicians to sign contracts
containing conflicts of interest due to the oversupply of physicians).
322. See, e.g., Neurology Code of ProfessionalConduct, supranote 61, at 1259 (Rule 5.2
requires both disclosure of financial interests that "might conflict with" the duty to patients and
avoidance of interests that "would, solely because of personal gain," influence the physician.).
323. Rodwin, supra note 283, at 605 (arguing that prohibition is one method of regulating
conflicts). ContraAM. MED. Assoc. COUNCILON MED. SERVS., supra note 319, at 8 ("Physicians
should have the right to enter into whatever contractual arrangements with health care systems
they deem desirable and necessary ... ").
324. Holleman et al., supra note 47, at 23 ("We believe that the practice of medicine
should not be reduced to a business transaction governed by... market principles .. "). Contra
Jeffrey M. Sconyers, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 640 (1994) ("Relationships with physicians are not
an absolute good; they are weighed against many other factors, each determined by individual

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

41

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 6
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54: 689

through a process of disclosure and bargaining, their expectation that their
physician will act solely in their best interest and will not be subject to a hidden
cost-cuttingfinancial incentive to deny care in exchange for lower-cost managed
healthcare? 326 We will look first at the potential harms of such a sale.
2.

Coercion

We are rightly concerned that patients might be tricked or coerced into
entering into a bargain without a full understanding or weighing of the costs and
benefits.327 Although proposals for a consent-based waiver of a physician's sole
agency contain mechanisms intended to deal with this problem, others argue that
these mechanisms are insufficient and that we cannot be certain that individuals,
particularly the poor and others without the means to select more expensive
alternatives, will not be forced into this bargain against their will. As a result, we
might forbid the bargain altogether as a precautionary measure to ensure that
coercion is not used. However, this rationale is troubling to the extent that we
recognize that the bargain does have very real benefits that, for some, may
outweigh the costs and make such incentives a rational choice. Highly educated
patients, or patients with medical training themselves, may feel competent to act
as their own advocates in the health care process or may feel that they can afford
to obtain second opinions in the event of a questionable recommendation from
their primary physician. The presence of financial incentives may not seem as
threatening to such individuals as to those with less education, with less
knowledge of the healthcare system, or who do not have the resources to obtain
second opinions. Further, financial incentives may lead to very real cost savings

consumers who make these hard choices every day."). Of course, this argument presupposes, as

do other market-based arguments, that the prerequisites of information and choice are present

to enable rational decision making to take place. See infra note 330; Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Allan

S. Brett, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 641 (1994) ("Many of the problems ...may not be obvious to
patients when they select health plans.... Whatever health care reform is adopted, it must be
evaluated in part according to its ability to strengthen the physician-patient relationship.").
325.

Of course, the term "sale" here is used metaphorically. This is consistent with

Professor Radin's assertion that "commodification includes not only actual buying and selling,

but also market rhetoric, the practice of thinking about interactions as if they were sale
transactions, and market methodology, the use of monetary cost-benefit analysis to judge these

interactions." Radin, supra note 302, at 1859.

326. Suggestions have been made in the literature that market mechanisms are
inappropriate to regulate managed care financial incentives. See Senco of Fla. v. Clark, 473 F.

Supp. 902,908 (M.D. Fla. 1979) (holding that since the original intent ofERISA was to prevent
employees from bargaining away benefits in employee benefit plans, this clearly shows that
some things are being removed from the bargaining table by governmental regulation, if they are
considered important enough); BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 11, at 318 ("Society and
the health professions need to address conflicts of interest ...by eliminatingsome conflicts as

well as by requiring disclosure of conflicts .... ");Brainerd, supra note 280, at A31
("'[Disclosure] merely passes the buck to the [patient], who is left to wonder how the
investigator will balance the competing interests ....Caveat emptor is simply not adequate in

this setting."') (discussing research conflicts rather than MCO conflicts); Rodwin, supra note
283, at 605 ("Public policy should restrict physician risk-sharing and manage care in other
ways."); Thompson, supra note 59, at 573, 574 ("Conflict-of-interest rules ... regulate the
disclosure and avoidance of [conflicts] ....[I]t is ...ethically more responsible to decide in
advance to remove insofar as possible factors that tend to [create conflicts].") (emphasis added).
327. Parmley et al., supra note 30, at 7 ("[T]he ideal of ethical medical practice is reflected
in establishing voluntary and uncoerced physician-patient relations"); id. at 8 ("[P]rinciples of
ethical behavior must stress ... the patient's right of free choice.").
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for the entire health care system, 32 enabling basic health services to be provided
to more individuals who otherwise would be unable to access these services. We
do not serve the low-income uninsured well if we deny them access to any
healthcare at all in order to protect them from a less than ideal physician-patient
relationship.329 Since we know that the number of uninsured in this country is
at a staggering level,33 provision of basic healthcare services for all must play
a large role in our reasoning. Because of this "double bind,"33 ' the anti-coercion
rationale for market-inalienability cannot alone justify imposition of an absolute
ban on physician financial incentives to deny care.
3. Damage to the Relationship
Some commentators have argued that to allow MCOs to impose financial
incentives on the physician-patient relationship will cause damage to that
relationship.332 Since trust is a necessary adjunct to a therapeutic relationship, the
patient should not fear that his physician is making specific recommendations,
not for his benefit, but in order to increase her compensation. Some
commentators argue that improperly strong or individualized managed care
incentives necessarily impair the physician-patient relationship, and that the
sorts of incentives which accompanied the fee-for-service market are
fundamentally different and less harmful to the physician-patient relationship
than the common managed care incentives.333 Others argue that imposition of
managed care incentives increasingly commodifies the services provided by the
physician, which leads to diminished trust. 334 To the extent that managed care

328. Bloche, supra note 196, at 269 ("[E]vidence suggests that putting physicians at risk
for the cost of their decisions ... restrains medical spending more effectively than do other
methods used by payers.") (citations omitted); Brian S. Armour et al., The Effect of Explicit
FinancialIncentives on Physician Behavior, 161 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 1261, 1261
(2001) (stating that incentives placing physician resources at risk are effective in reducing
resource usage). But see supra notes 2-3 (showing data suggesting that cost savings produced
by managed care were transitory and American health care is returning to double digit inflation).
329. See Sharona Hoffman, Unmanaged Care: Towards Moral Fairnessin Health Care
Coverage,78 Ind. L.J. (forthcoming May 2003); Parmley et al., supra note 30, at 9 (discussing
the ethical principle of distributive justice).
330. In 2000, there were 38.7 million Americans, or fourteen percent of the population,
without health coverage for the entire year. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HEALTH INSURANCE
COVERAGE:
2000
1
(Sept.
2001),
available
at
http://www.census.gov/hhes/hlthin00/hlt00asc.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2003).
331. Radin, supra note 302, at 1915.
332. See, e.g., Bursztajn, supra note 271, at 241 (absence of meaningful choice in the
health care context leads to diminution of trust and therapeutic potential of the doctor-patient
relationship); Schwartz, supra note 4, at 127 (addressing the potential for lost trust); Relman,
supra note 12, at 24 ("The risk is that professional autonomy and professional values may be
subordinated to business interests and that the ethical basis of the doctor-patient relationship may
erode."). But see Mark A. Hall et al., How Disclosing HMO PhysicianIncentives Affects Trust:
Not All Cost-Minimizing Physician Incentives are Ethically Troubling to Patients, HEALTH
AFFAIRS, March/April 2002, at 197,200 (stating that disclosure of physician incentives resulted
in 1.4% increase in physician trust compared to lack of disclosure).
333. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 127 ("[A] person is much more prepared to utilize
autonomy in refusing health care from a provider than in demanding health care that has not been
offered and about which she may know nothing.").
334. Feldman et al., supra note 45, at 1630 ("[P]hysicians may come to see themselves
more as economic commodities and less as professionals with obligations to uphold. Such a
diminished sense of obligation to professional mores could eventually undermine physicianpatient trust."); Edmund D. Pellegrino, Words Can Hurt You: Some Reflections on the
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incentives damage those physician-patient relationships in which they are
present, then, this may justify market-inalienability.
4. Damage to All Relationships

A further strand of commentary argues that managed care incentives do not
only impair those relationships in which they are present, but rather impair all
physician-patient relationships.335 Patients may enter their physicians' offices
with foreknowledge of the widespread existence of incentives to restrict care and
may even overestimate the strength of such incentives in light of horror stories336
reported in the news.337 To the extent that managed care incentives are the
subject of popular reporting (and misreporting), popular knowledge of the
presence of such incentives in the marketplace may lead to decreased public
trust in physicians and in the health care system generally, eliminating or
diminishing the necessary element of trust even in those physician-patient
relationships free of improper managed care incentives.33 Reports of successful
plaintiffs in managed care litigation may lead to an increased willingness to
threaten legal action in an attempt to protect one's health.33 9 This "domino
effect"'

can partially respond to the criticism of the coercion justification

discussed above; to the extent that the existence of managed care incentives
drives the existence of therapeutic physician-patient relationships out of the
market, their market-inalienability is justified.
One might argue, from these three justifications, that market-inalienability
is the answer to regulation of managed care financial incentives and that they
should be barred from the market to preserve the physician-patient relationship
necessary to successful medical outcomes. However, there is more to the
analysis. One criticism of the noncommodification proposal outlined here might
be that it violates the patient's autonomy interest. By removing certain aspects
of the physician-patient relationship from the bargaining table, we limit the
scope of choices available to the patient, choices which he might find personally
attractive. In addition to the autonomy argument, Dr. Bloche reminds us that we
must take care to avoid the utopian fallacy-measuring our proposed solution

Metaphorsof Managed Care, 7 J. AM. BD. OF FAM. PRAc. 505, 505 (1994); David Blumenthal,
Effects of Market Reforms on Doctors and Their Patients,HEALTH AFFAIRS, Spring-Summer

1996, at 170, 179-80. Commodification may entail other effects of managed care as well, such
as the impact of constantly shifting managed care panels on continuity of care. See, e.g.,
Holleman et al., supra note 276, at 21-22 (describing the impact of lack of continuity of care has
on the doctor-patient relationship and the potential effect on health outcomes).
335. Radin, supra note 302, at 1912-13 (describing "a slippery slope leading to market

domination. .

.

. [in which] [t]o commodify some things is simply to preclude their

noncommodified analogues from existing."); see also Robert L. Lowes, ExplainingThings to an
Angry Managed-CarePatient,74 MED. ECON. 143 (1997) (presenting issues involved in doctor-

patient discussions about managed care and treatment options).

336. Ellyn E. Spragins, Beware Your HMO, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 23, 1995, at 54; David A.
Hyman, RegulatingManagedCare: What's Wrong with a PatientBill ofRights?, 73 S. CAL. L.

REv. 221, 222 (2000) ("In just a few short years, managed care has gone from the darling of
health policy wonks to the moral equivalent of the tobacco companies.").
337. Lowes, supra note 335, at 143, 144 (reporting that twenty percent of managed care
patients believe that MCOs pressure physicians to put "wealth before their health").

338. Winters et al., supra note 50, at 15.
339. Lowes, supra note 335, at 143.
340. Radin, supra note 302, at 1912-13.
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against a vision of an ideal world341 rather than our existing world, marred as it
is by injustice, inequality, and disempowerment. In light ofthe difficulties facing

us, Professor Radin suggests market-inalienability may in reality move us further

from our ideals.342 We should consider whether there is a compromise between
absolute market-inalienability and full commodification of the physician-patient

relationship that will address the worst effects of managed care incentives while
preserving their benefits in light of real-world economic and other pressures.

5. Autonomy and Inalienability
The proposal to prohibit consent on certain economic conflicts would
narrow the theoretical range of choices available to patients and, in that sense,
would prevent them from exercising the full range of autonomous choices the
market would otherwise make available. However, we have seen that in many
cases, patients or beneficiaries of managed care plans in fact are not free to
choose from the entire theoretical spectrum of health care options, but are
presented with a narrow range of health care choices. In many cases, a
beneficiary of an employer-sponsored health plan has only one plan sponsor to
choose, although there may be more than one "style" of plan offered. In many
cases, the employer's contribution to health care costs may only cover the cost
of the cheapest and most restrictive health plan or may not even completely
cover that, and the additional costs of a plan with fewer or less onerous cost
controls prohibitive may be for many employees. In such cases, the Hobson's
choice offered to employees is a poor substitute for the autonomy principle. In
fact, by removing the worst cost-containment strategies from the managed care
marketplace, a more robust regulatory system would allow beneficiaries more
meaningful choices among the remaining options, including options which hold
down costs by implementing reasonable and rational cost-containment
strategies.343
6. Avoiding The Utopian Fallacy-A Rule ofReason
The utopian fallacy remains a real pitfall for a noncommodification
proposal. Professor Radin admonishes us that we must take care, in envisioning

341. Bloche, supra note 196, at 269 ("[An] absolutist approach [to divided clinical
loyalties] is open to the charge that it takes a penurious view of the medical profession's public
responsibility."); Chervenak et al., supra note 6, at 525 (arguing that elimination of physician
conflicts of interest is not realistic).
342. Radin, supra note 302, at 1917.
[T]he double bind means that if we choose market-inalienability, we might
deprive a class of poor and oppressed people of the opportunity to
have.., a better chance to lead a humane life. Those who gain from the
market-inalienability, on the other hand, might be primarily people whose
wealth and power make them comfortable enough to be concerned about
the inroads on the general quality of life that commodification would make.
Id.
343. See infra notes 348-50 and accompanying text (rejecting full noncommodification in
favor of a reasonableness analysis). Professor Radin suggests further that the autonomy or
paternalism criticism may be answered by appeal to "a positive view of liberty that includes
proper self-development as necessary for freedom .... " In that view, "inalienabilities needed
to foster that development will be seen as freedom-enhancing rather than as impositions of
Radin, supra note 302, at 1899.
unwanted restraints on our desires ....
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an ideal state, not to create more problems than we solve. For the involuntarily
uninsured, imperfect health care is superior to no health care at all. 3'" One
response to this criticism would be to demand that society reengineer itself to
provide health care to all, in order to remove the potential coercive effect of lack
of insurance. 4 Given the recent failures of attempted large-scale health care
reforms, 3" this response can be dismissed as unlikely.
There is another approach to noncommodification that takes account of both
the dangers of the marketplace and the realities of a predominantly marketdriven industry.3 47 For Professor Radin, commodification is not an all-or-nothing
doctrine.348 We can choose incomplete commodification in order to avoid a
solution that would
349 "accord with our ideals but cause too much harm in our
nonideal world.
What might an incomplete commodification of the physician-patient
relationship look like? Although there are many possible answers to that
question, any answer depends on the values we seek to preserve from the
marketplace. The key attributes of the doctor-patient relationship, it seems, are
the duty of the physician to place the patient's welfare above her own, the
related duty to advocate for the best interests of her patient, and the concomitant
therapeutic trust in the physician by the patient that is made possible by secure
knowledge of the physician's loyalty to him. Any regulatory system which seeks
to preserve these attributes strikes a balance of incomplete commodification of
the physician-patient relationship.35
D. Incomplete Commodification in Practice
This Article has argued that the law of managed care regulation should
avoid an uncritical embrace of the "commercial culture 3 51 of modem medicine
and should instead actively seek to promote the "professional culture" in order
to protect the patient from undue overreaching by commercial interests, as well
as to protect the physician's ability to advocate for, and take therapeutic action
based on, the patient's best interest. Such an approach would address the
criticism that the current system of health care regulation focuses too
simplistically on whatever problem has captured the attention of the public, the
news media, and thus the politicians.352 Rather than a fragmented approach to
fixing the shortcomings of our health care system, a regulatory system which
344. Id. at 1911 ("It is as if, when someone is coerced at gunpoint, we were to direct or
moral opporobrium at the victim.., and our enforcement efforts at preventing the victim from
handing over her money ...").
345. Id. ("[T]his aspect of liberal prophylactic pluralism is hypocritical without a largescale redistribution of wealth and power that seems highly improbable.").
346. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text (discussing the failed Clinton health
care reform plan).
347. Radin, supra note 302, at 1915 ("[J]ustice under nonideal circumstances.., consists
in choosing the best alternative now available to us.").
348. Id. at 1855 ("[M]any things can be described as incompletely commodified... [t]hus,
we may decide that some things should be market-inalienable only to a degree, or only in some
aspects.").

349. Id. at 1918.

350. Id. at 1857 (arguing that in a market-dominated, laissez-faire environment, regulation
may equate with noncommodification).

351. See supra notes 8-15 and accompanying text on the conflict between the commercial

and professional cultures in modern medical practice.

352. See supra note 49.
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maintains at its core a focus on the preservation of the physician-patient
relationship from the worst excesses of the marketplace has the potential to
produce a more coherent and orderly system of regulation. Although a
systematic articulation of the effects of implementation of partial
decommodification of the physician-patient relationship is beyond the scope of
this Article, this section will sketch the contours of what such a principle might
mean in the context of three current health policy debates.
1. Managed Care FinancialConflicts of Interest
A main focus of this Article has been the direct and indirect conflicts of
interest created by MCOs through the design of their reimbursement
mechanisms for physicians. These incentives are designed to align the interest
of the physician with those of the MCO and to alter physicians' practice patterns
in order to induce medical practice that maximizes the MCO's economic
efficiency.3" 3 A system of incomplete commodification recognizes that there is
no realistic way to completely eliminate financial considerations from the
practice of medicine. Indeed, from the beginning, medicine has recognized and
sought to ameliorate the difficulties inherent in the juxtaposition of the
helplessness of the ill and the superior knowledge and bargaining power of the
healer. For most of medical history, these issues have been dealt with through
systems of professional ethics.354 Self-regulation is the hallmark of a profession,
and, until recently, American physicians have been remarkably free of oversight
in the manner and mode in which they practiced their art. In the past decade,
oversight has been imposed not only by the government, but by the insurance
companies and MCOs that hold the nation's medical care purse strings. Because
these organizations are constrained by neither the professional ethics of the
physician nor by the public accountability of government, we should be
skeptical of their ability to adequately protect the interests of patients. Careful
regulation can enhance both the power of managed care to deliver medical
services more efficiently and of physicians to work within an efficiency-driven
system to advocate for patients' best interests, both individually and collectively.
In a previous article,3"' I have advocated an emphasis on the professional
duty of the physician to place the interests of the patient first. Analogizing the
physician's relationship to the patient with that of the lawyer to her client, I
proposed that states adopt a rule of professional regulation for physicians that
mirrors that widely adopted for attorneys-that the physician be ethically and
legally prohibited from entering into any relationship with an MCO that

353. See discussion supra Part II.
354. The Hippocratic Oath contains an injunction stating, "Whatever houses I may visit,
I will come for the benefit of the sick, remaining free of all intentional injustice, of all
mischief ....
See Oath of Hippocrates, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 1731 (Warren T.
Reich ed., 1978). The American Medical Association speaks to this matter in Section 8.03 of its
Code of Medical Ethics: "Under no circumstances may physicians place their own financial
interests above the welfare of their patients .... If a conflict develops between the physician's
financial interest and the physician's responsibilities to the patient, the conflict must be resolved
to the patient's benefit." AMA COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, CODE OF MEDICAL
ETHICS, reprinted in MEDICAL ETHICS: CODES, OPINIONS and STATEMENTS, at 35 (Baruch A.
Brody et al. eds. 2000).
355. Hall, supra note 17.
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unreasonably
interferes with the physician's ability to act in her patient's best
356
interest.

Such a rule would constitute a partial noncommodification of the physicianpatient relationship. It would restrict the range of choices that would be available
to physicians and MCOs and limit the availability of "incentives to deny care."
At the same time, it would preserve the essentially self-regulated nature of
medical practice and avoid unnecessary imposition of specific rules on an everchanging medical marketplace. It would allow state regulatory agencies to
develop a sense of reasonableness of incentives on a case-by-case basis and in
a quasi-judicial "common-law" process.3 Finally, such a regulatory approach

would protect patients from overreaching incentives imposed by MCOs and
would give doctors a noneconomic bargaining chip in negotiations with MCOs
to avoid those incentives which physicians believe will be detrimental to patient
care. Finally, it would avoid the "piecemeal" approach to regulation of managed
care in the state legislatures.358 Imposition of a reasonableness standard, coupled
with a legislative endorsement of the principle of the paramount importance of
the physician-patient relationship in the therapeutic process, would provide state
regulators with a framework for deciding whether new forms of incentives or
reimbursement are in fact unreasonable, which would free state legislators from
the need to respond legislatively to each new market innovation.
Although the financial arrangements and incentives contractually agreed to
by MCOs and physicians are an important part of the incentive structure created
by modem managed care, they are not the whole picture. The remainder of this
section will examine two other areas in which health care law and practice create
undesirable incentives for physicians, leading to incentives to breach the duty
of trust and loyalty contained in the physician-patient relationship.
2. Medical Privacy

A system of regulation that focuses on the preservation of the therapeutic
physician-patient relationship will take seriously the protection of physicianpatient communications and the concomitant problem of protection of medical
information. This requires a careful balancing of interests since both expanded
access to medical information has great potential to enhance the therapeutic
relationship and the outcomes of treatment.? With the expansion of
information-sharing technologies, physicians and hospitals can now share
relevant medical information over great 311
distances in order to tailor medical care
to the needs of an individual patient. However, the ease of information
sharing, coupled with the great potential commercial value of individual medical

356. Id. at 138-39.
357. Id. at 142.
358. Id. at 140, 142.
359. See e.g., PocketScript Enables Physicansto Execute Secure ElectronicPrescriptions
Using TheirBlackberry WirelessHandhelds,PRNEWSWIRE, Jan. 7,2003; Maura Lerner, Private
Records, Public Benefit, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Dec. 15, 2002, at IA (describing the use of
medical data to improve health outcomes).
360. Nicolas P. Terry, Forward: E-Health: PerspectiveandPromise, 46 ST. Louis U. L.J.
1, 1(2002).
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data,36 ' can lead and has led to abuses.362 In one widely publicized instance,
patients who were prescribed the antidepressant Prozac were surprised to receive
in the mail unordered free samples of a new, extended-release form of the
drug.363 The mailing came from the drug's manufacturer 364 in an attempt to
generate patient desire to switch their treatment plan from the short-acting drug
to the 36new,
more convenient (and presumably more profitable) extended-release
5
form.

Clearly, this sort of use of private medical data was an abuse of patients'
privacy interests as well as an abuse of the physician-patient relationship,366 and
media commentary quickly focused on the fact that, under the then-pending
regulations of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA), 367 such marketing would be unlawful without the express consent of
the individuals. 368 However, less dramatic commercial uses of individual
medical information are more routine. 369 A regulatory system which values and
seeks to preserve the physician-patient relationship would try to prevent
physician participation in a direct marketing campaign to patients, particularly
when disclosure of a patient's treatment might be stigmatic or embarassing to
a patient. Failure to adequately protect personalized medical information from
inappropriate disclosure and commercial abuse can have a negative impact on
patients' willingness to participate in treatment. 370 Fear of disclosure leads to an
unwillingness on the part of patients to accurately and completely disclose their
own health status and risky behaviors and may also lead to physicians'
unwillingness to accurately and completely document the patient's medical
history and health status in medical records."7' Although a system which values
the personhood of patients would provide patients with choices as to their

361. Adam Liptak, FreeProzac in the Junk Mail Draws a Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, July 6,
2002, at Al.
362. A listing of reports of misuses of medical information is beyond the scope of this
Article. For examples, see Janlori Goldman, The New FederalHealth PrivacyRegulations: How
Will States Take the Lead?, 29 J. LAW, MED. & ETHICs 395, 396 & nn. 13-17 (2001).
363. See Liptak, supra note 361. It is not clear precisely how prescriptions covering these
mailings were obtained. See Glenn Singer, ProzacMakerSuspends Workers Over FreeSamples,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 9, 2002, at Cl (reporting company's belief that "doctors' offices
generated lists of patients taking Prozac, wrote prescriptions and send [sic] them directly to
Walgreens"). The exact number of unsolicited mailings is not known.
364. See Liptak, supra note 361 ("[T]he form letter that accompanied the Prozac was
apparently prepared by a sales representative for Lilly; it was signed by the [patient's] doctor and
two other local doctors.").
365. Id. ("Lilly's patent for Prozac expired [in August 2001], and the drug's sales have
dropped more than 80 percent as generic equivalents have become available. But Prozac Weekly
is still under patent.").
366. The drug manufacturer in question, Eli Lilly, quickly suspended several of its
employees who were involved with the promotion. Singer, supra note 363.
367. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
368. 45 C.F.R. § 164.506 (2002). However, it is important to note that even this consent
requirement suffers from potentially coercive exceptions-a "covered health provider" can
condition provision of services, and a health plan may condition enrollment, on consent to the
disclosure of health information. § 164.506(b)(1),(2).
369. See Liptak, supranote 361. (noting that mailing of drugs is "one step beyond" normal
pharmaceutical promotional practices, but is "part of 'the increasing trend for the
commercialization of health care information .. being bought, sold and used like any other
commodity"').
370. Goldman, supra note 362, at 399.
371. Id. at 396&n.11.
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decisions are best made in direct
commercial solicitations devoid of
In particular, individualized patient
be "bought, sold and used like any

3. PatientProtectionActs
Part of the "backlash" against managed care practices nationwide is the
proliferation of "Patient Bills of Rights" or "Patient Protection Acts." Although
such legislation has been stalled in the Congress since the events of September
11, 2001, there has been much activity both before and since then in state
legislatures. Because of the potentially sweeping nature of ERISA preemption,
and because of the complexity of the Supreme Court's gloss on ERISA
preemption analysis, many of these state protection measures have been, and
continue to be, tested in the courts against challenges from MCOs claiming that
state patient protections are preempted by ERISA's limited remedies. Although
many patient protection measures have yet to be finally resolved by the courts,
recent Supreme Court ERISA jurisprudence suggests a strong disinclination to
leave managed care regulation to Congress, and thus a strong desire on the part
of the Court to allow states leeway in fashioning regulatory strategies for the
managed care industry.
In Pegram the Court refused to hold that an MCO's financial incentive
arrangements were a violation of ERISA's fiduciary duties imposed on a plan's
375
administrators."' While this denied the plaintiff in Pegram an ERISA remedy,
it strongly suggested that the Court would not consider state laws regulating
managed care financial incentives to be preempted by ERISA. In Moran the
Court held that Illinois' law mandating external review of an MCO's decision
to deny access to care as "medically unnecessary" was not preempted by
ERISA.376 As of this writing, the Supreme Court is considering a challenge by
a managed care industry group to a Kentucky law which mandates that an MCO
allow any physician willing to conform to that MCO's rules and regulations
access to the MCO's network and patient population.377 These laws, which have
been enacted in several states, are generally referred to as "any willing provider"
or "AWP" statutes. Managed care organizations oppose these laws because they

372. See David Fasssler, Letter to the Editor, Erosions of Privacy and FreeProzac,N.Y.

TIMES, July 10, 2002, at A20 ("[P]hysicians should never access or use identifiable clinical

information about specific patients for commercial or marketing purposes .... [A]ppropriate

treatment involves a comprehensive evaluation by a trained and qualified mental health

professional."). For another view, see Liptak, supra note 361, quoting a spokeswoman for one
of the defendants in the Prozac lawsuit that "[tihis particular effort... was the result of wellintentioned, respected physicians being given an opportunity to arrange for some of their patients
to receive sample medications, at no cost, through proper, licensed pharmacy channels."

373. Liptak, supra note 361; see also Marsha Austin, Health Care Invasion? Concept
Saves Employers Money at Expense of Privacy, DENVER POST, Nov. 10, 2002, at KI (detailing
efforts by employers to gain access to employees' medical data in order to identify "consumers
who may be at risk for developing expensive.., medical conditions and pairing them with nurse
managers .... ).
374. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
375. The plaintiff had already won a remedy for medical malpractice in the state court.
376. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002).
377. See Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Nichols, 227 F.3d 352 (6th Cir. 2000),
cert. grantedsub nom Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 122 S. Ct. 2657 (2002).
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interfere with the MCO's ability to engage in "economic credentialing," which
is, to select for participation in the network only those physicians who have
proven an ability to practice cost-effective medicine.' In contrast, consumer
advocates and other proponents of AWP laws argue that the statutes ensure that
an MCO provide sufficient physicians to fulfill its members' needs, both for a
full complement of s9pecialty care and for full geographic coverage of the
relevant population."'
A regulatory system which is committed to the physician-patient
relationship would look favorably on AWP state legislation. One of the
"bargains" in the subscriber-MCO contract has been the subscriber's agreement
to give up free choice of physician in exchange for the benefits of MCO
coverage. However, this bargain has led to widely reported dissatisfaction, as
MCOs change their physician networks frequently and patients have been forced
to discontinue longstanding doctor-patient relationships in order to preserve
affordable health coverage."80 A well-crafted AWP law can address both the
needs of the MCO and those of the patient. AWP laws typically require an MCO
to permit physicians willing to adhere to the MCOs rules and regulations to
participate in that MCO's provider network."' They do not require an MCO to
provide network access and reimbursement to any physician without regard to
the physician's cost-effective practice of medicine, nor do they require any
particular physician to participate in any particular MCO panel. However, these
laws do provide a valuable "safety valve" for patients and physicians in longterm treatment relationships. Ultimately, it is up to the individual physician's
professional ethics and judgment whether to seek inclusion in a managed care
panel, and whether a particular MCO's terms and conditions are ethically and
financially acceptable, in order to benefit a patient or group of patients. In many
cases, the burden of seeking participation in a new managed care panel and
complying with its terms and conditions may not outweigh the benefits to be
gained for the patient.382 However, this decision ultimately should rest with the
physician, in consultation with the patient or group of patients affected, not with
the MCO. AWP laws protect the patient by allowing her to maintain important
doctor-patient relationships, while protecting the interests of the MCO by
requiring that any participating physician comply with the terms and conditions
established by the MCO for all its participating physicians.

378. See, e.g., American Managed Behavioral Healthcare Association, Public Policy
Statements: Any Willing Provider("Consumer choice is a public policy objective well served
by AWP laws .... Choice must be balanced with accountability and efficiency. AWP laws fail

the accountability and efficiency goals of public policy."),
http://www.ambha.org/publicpolicy/anywilling.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2002).
379. See Minnesota Physician-Patient Alliance, Legislation: The HMO FairCompetition
Act ("The purpose of the [proposed AWP] bill was to address continuity ofcare issues and rural
patients' access to care in the context of exclusive provider networks."), http://www.physicianpatient.org/mppa/legislation/anywilling.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2002).

380. See, e.g., Holleman et al., supranote 47, at 22 (describing a case in which "the efforts
of physician and patient to cultivate a successful therapeutic relationship.., were undermined
by a series of business decisions viewing money, not health, as the bottom line").
381. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.17A-270 (Michie 2001) ("A health insurer shall
not discriminate against any provider who is located within the geographic coverage area of the
health benefit plan and who is willing to meet the terms and conditions for participation
established by the health insurer ... ").
382. Holleman et al., supra note 47, at 24.
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V. CONCLUSION

Managed care has served a useful purpose in American health law by
bringing the shortcomings of the fee-for-service system to the attention of
consumers, physicians, policymakers, and others. As the cost savings realized
by managed care wane and the political backlash against many MCO practices
continues, many have begun to wonder whether the managed care revolution is
effectively over and, if so, what sort of health care system will replace managed
care.3" 3 One of the most telling criticisms of managed care is that it has allowed
its cost-control function to override, at least in some ways and for some
consumers, the fundamental truth of the physician-patient relationship--that the
physician's ultimate responsibility must be to the individual patient. In other
words, the market orientation of the MCO has in part supplanted the patient care
ethic of medical professionalism. The goal of this Article has been to
demonstrate that the market paradigm is ill suited to the physician-patient
relationship, and that the relationship between doctor and patient should not, in
the final analysis, be one of arm's length bargaining but of trust and
responsibility. Partial decommodification of the physician-patient relationship
would be a step toward restoration of patient trust in the health care system384 as
well as in individual physicians, and toward restoration of the satisfaction of
physicians in the practice of medicine. We would do well, as we design and
implement the next generation of American health care delivery, to keep in mind
these goals.

383. Relman, supra note 57, at 750 ("[T]here can be no really satisfactory solution until
the medical profession itself faces up to the threat of entrepreneurialism and decides to take a
firm stand in defense of professional ethics.").
384. Id.
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